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Abstract:
This cumulative dissertation covers the concepts of scenario-based strategic planning and stra-
tegic management in family fi rms over fi ve articles. The fi rst article gives an overview of the 
cumulative dissertation explaining the research gap, approach and contribution of the disserta-
tion. The paper highlights the two research areas covered by the dissertation with two articles 
focusing on scenario-based strategic planning and two on strategic management in family fi rms. 
The second article is the fi rst of two focusing on scenario-based strategic planning. It introduces 
and describes a set of six tools facilitating the implementation of scenario-based strategic plan-
ning in corporate practice. The third paper adapts these tools to the fi nancial management and 
controlling context in private companies highlighting the tools’ fl exibility in managing uncer-
tain and volatile environments. The fourth article is the fi rst of two focusing on strategic ma-
nagement in family fi rms. It analyzes organizational ambidexterity as a factor explaining family 
fi rm performance. The article shows, that a high level of organizational ambidexterity in family 
fi rms leads to a higher family fi rm performance. The fi nal paper concludes the dissertation exa-
mining the tendency of family fi rms to focus on capability exploration or resource exploitation 
over different generations managing the family fi rm.
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MANAGEMENT IN FAMILY FIRMS 
 
Overview of the cumulative dissertation 
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1. Research Question and Goal of the Dissertation  
A sound and effective strategic management in volatile, complex and uncertain 
environmental conditions requires a comprehensive strategic management to 
support a firm in obtaining and sustaining a competitive advantage (Miller, 2008; 
Porter, 1985). Strategic management refers to the process through which firms 
align their resources with their goals and opportunities meaning that firms decide 
in the present what they want to achieve in the future (Kotler, 1967).  
 
Firms that manage their resources strategically are not only analyzing the current 
state of their business, but also think ahead how to use upcoming business 
opportunities in an increasingly dynamic, volatile and uncertain environment 
(Porter, 1980; Tapinos, Dyson, & Meadows, 2005). Analyzing the current state of a 
company gives unique insights into a company’s resources. Yet, it can be a 
challenging task where strategies tend to be obtained through very formalized 
processes (Ward, 1988). Consequently conflicts and debates within a firm as to 
which process or form of strategic management is best suited to achieve future 
goals are common. Initial studies in strategic management research often 
regarded this conflict between choosing the right plan or process to obtain a 
strategy as necessary to achieve a competitive advantage, i.e. earning a 
persistently higher rate of profit, or having the potential to earn a persistently 
higher rate of profit (Ansoff, 1991; Brews & Hunt, 1999; Grant, 2000; Mintzberg, 
1990).  
 
However, more recent studies present a range of solutions to achieve a 
competitive advantage where individuals developing strategies are more important 
than the company itself (Whittington, 1996) or seeing strategic management in a 
wider company context where soft elements such as organizational culture or firm 
values are more important in achieving a competitive advantage than the actual 
process of developing a strategy (Jarzabkowski & Balogun, 2009).  
 
One approach identified by the strategic management literature capable of 
overcoming the weaknesses of existing strategic planning tools while maintaining 
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their strengths is scenario planning (Schoemaker, 1995). Scenario Planning allows 
strategic planners to use a structured process, analyzing the current state of their 
firm gaining unique insights into its resources whilst allowing enough room for 
debate and space to think ahead in different pictures of the future how an 
increasingly dynamic, volatile and uncertain environment shapes forthcoming 
developments (Chermack, Lynham, & Ruona, 2001; van der Heijden, 2005; Wack, 
1985; Wright & Cairns, 2011).  
 
Yet, traditional scenario planning processes are time and resource consuming and 
complex meaning they are hard to apply as a straightforward strategic planning 
and management tool in corporate practice (Millet, 2003; Moyer, 1996). Moreover, 
existing scenario planning techniques tend to be scarcely explained meaning no 
common methodology or step-by-step guide on how companies can use scenarios 
as a strategic management tool exists (Schwenker & Boetzel, 2007). 
Consequently the development and open publication of a more straightforward 
and tool based scenario planning methodology would be beneficial both for 
strategic management research as an academic field as well as corporate 
practice.  
 
Constructing multiple future scenarios answering critical questions regarding how 
a company can sustain its competitive advantage always requires participants to 
think long-term, usually a minimum of five years ahead (Godet, 2000). One unique 
type of firm that is particularly well suited when it comes to long-term thinking is a 
family firm. Families and their corresponding firms naturally foster advantages 
regarding long-term performance and survival (Nicholson, 2008) through accepting 
a longer time horizon for financial returns (Zellweger, Meister, & Fueglistaller, 
2007) as well as patient capital investments (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). Research in the 
entrepreneurship, strategic management and family firm literature has recognized 
that family firms automatically adopt a long-term approach when it comes to their 
strategic management practices since long-term survival across generations is the 
overarching goal of any family business (Kellermanns & Eddleston, 2006; Ward, 
1987). Passing the family business to the next generation in a better financial 
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shape compared to when the current generation obtained control of the business 
is the prime goal of a family firm (Nicholson, 2008). Creating and sustaining a 
competitive advantage not only in the short-term, but over generations is the basic 
principle governing strategic management in family firms (Sharma & Salvato, 
2011).  
 
While a large body of research has demonstrated the uniqueness of family firms 
compared to non-family firms (Chrisman, Chua, & Steier, 2003; Habbershon & 
Williams, 1999; Ward, 1987), with most research largely focusing on the 
performance effect of being a family business (Habbershon, Williams, & 
MacMillan, 2003; Rutherford, Kuratko, & Holt, 2008; Zellweger et al., 2007), only 
little research has been conducted so far on how families manage their business 
strategically over different generational stages (Sharma & Salvato, 2011). A new 
stream on strategic management in family firms over different life-cycle stages and 
thus generations has emerged to fill this gap (Dawson, Sharma, Irving, Marcus, & 
Chirico, 2013; Zellweger, Kellermanns, Chrisman, & Chua, 2012). Nevertheless, 
more research on strategic management in family firms leading to a competitive 
advantage over generations is called for (Sharma & Salvato, 2011). Above all the 
effect of different generations managing a family firm on the firm’s strategic 
management activities to create a competitive advantage has not been analyzed 
empirically so far.  
 
This dissertation overcomes both gaps present in the management literature on 
scenario planning and the family firm literature on strategic management in family 
firms by introducing a tool-based approach to scenario planning and an empirical 
research design analyzing the generational impact present in family firms. The 
thesis thus has two goals: First, it aims to develop a more straightforward and 
structured approach to scenario-based strategic planning by systematically 
analyzing the tools and steps of the developed methodology as well as providing 
examples of their application in a corporate context. Second, it aims at creating 
insights on how successful family firms manage their business over varying life-
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The second paper “Szenariobasierte Strategische Planung in Volatilen Umfeldern” 
explores the adaptability of the HHL Roland Berger approach to scenario-based 
strategic planning to the financial management and controlling context in private 
companies. It thus sets out to close the research gap assuming that existing 
scenario-based strategic planning methodologies are too complex and resource 
intensive to be applied in corporate practice. Due to the demanding characteristics 
of a firm’s finance function this paper particularly contributes to relevant theoretical 
and practical benefits of applying the HHL Roland Berger approach to scenario-
based strategic planning when creating future scenarios.  
 
Focusing on the second set of goals, the third and fourth paper make the transition 
to family firm research creating insights on how successful family firms manage 
their business over varying life-cycle stages creating a sustained competitive 
advantage. The paper “Organizational Ambidexterity and Family Firm 
Performance” empirically examines how family influence affects the level of 
organizational ambidexterity (OA) in creating a higher performance level and thus 
a sustained competitive advantage. The paper empirically combines research on 
family firms and strategic management through a survey with 104 private German 
family firms introducing OA to the controversial debate on how family firms obtain 
and sustain a competitive advantage.  
 
The finale paper “The Impact of Successor Generation Discount in Family Firms: 
Examining Nonlinear Effects on Exploration and Exploitation” concludes this 
dissertation by empirically analyzing the effect of different generations managing a 
family firm on their tendency to obtain a competitive advantage through either 
capability exploration or resource exploitation. A dataset of 125 German private 
family firms is used to test the paper’s hypotheses and close the previously 
mentioned research gap. The paper offers distinct insights how during different 
generational stages family firms attempt to achieve a competitive advantage 
through capability exploration and resource exploitation suggesting a high difficulty 
for family firms to simultaneously pursue both. 
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With the introduction and explanation of the HHL Roland Berger approach to 
scenario-based strategic planning as well as its exemplary application to the 
finance function this dissertation contributes to strategic management and 
scenario planning research. It further provides insights on how family firms use 
different strategic management approaches to create a competitive advantage 
through two different empirical studies. It thus goes on to show how both scenario 
planning and strategic management in family firms, whose effects are extensively 
claimed in the literature, can in fact help companies in general and family firms in 
particular attain and maintain a sustained competitive advantage.  
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2. Summary of Papers 
The first paper “Six-Tools for Scenario-Based Strategic Planning and Their 
Application” is a structured and hands-on explanation of the HHL Roland Berger 
approach to scenario-based strategic planning. A core critique of scenario 
planning has so far been its complexity and resource intensity both in terms of 
time and manpower when being used as part of a company’s strategic planning 
process. Moreover, senior executives and strategic planners often found it difficult 
to grasp the essence of scenario planning and translate the advantages of the 
approach into their existing strategic planning practices. The paper overcomes 
these shortcomings by providing a detailed overview of the six steps and tools that 
can be used to initiate and execute a scenario-based strategic planning project. 
Based on an analysis of the HHL Roland Berger approach to scenario-based 
strategic planning, the paper describes each process step and the application of 
the tools in detail.  
 
First, each process step is put into the context of the latest developments in 
research on strategic and scenario planning highlighting its respective theoretical 
implications. Next, each step of the process and the respective tool facilitating its 
application is explained. Finally, an example based on the European airline 
industry for the practical application of each process step and tool is provided and 
explained in order to visualize the ease of using the HHL Roland Berger approach 
as part of a scenario-based strategic planning project. The paper, co-authored by 
Torsten Wulf and Philip Meissner has been published as part of the book 
“Scenario-Based Strategic Planning”, edited by Burkhard Schwenker and Torsten 
Wulf. The book is published by Springer Gabler, Wiesbaden (2013).1 The author’s 
main contribution to the paper is the structured integration of the HHL Roland 
Berger approach to scenario-based strategic planning into the latest developments 
in research on strategic and scenario planning, the methodologically and 
didactically sound explanation of the approach including the development of 
                                                          
1 ISBN: 978-3-658-02874-9 
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relevant examples as well as the knowledge transfer of an academic, theoretical 
approach into practice.  
 
The paper “Szenariobasierte Strategische Planung in Volatilen Umfeldern” is an 
adaptation of the HHL Roland Berger approach to scenario-based strategic 
planning to the financial management and controlling context in private 
companies. Companies are constantly looking for new instruments in order to 
cope with an increasing uncertainty, volatility and complexity in their daily 
operations. Especially the finance and controlling functions in a company are 
affected by more volatile and uncertain revenue streams as well as earnings 
making it more difficult to make sound financial projections and forecasts.  
 
The paper introduces scenario-based strategic planning as an instrument for 
corporate and financial planners as well as controllers to cope with more volatile 
and uncertain revenue streams helping to improve the accuracy of controlling 
forecasts. In this context the paper highlights the strengths of the HHL Roland 
Berger approach to scenario-based strategic planning through its standardized 
tool-set facilitating the flexible implementation of the approach into a company’s 
finance function and budgetary planning processes. The paper thus provides a 
structured analysis of the theoretical and practical knowledge transfer of scenario 
planning into the finance function companies. The paper, which is co-authored by 
Torsten Wulf, Stephan Stubner and Philip Meissner has been published in the 
special issue 2 / 2012 of Controlling & Management.2 The author’s main 
contribution is the theoretical and practical adaptation of the HHL Roland Berger 
approach to scenario-based strategic planning to the finance and controlling 
context. In addition the author extensively contributed to the creation and revision 
of the structure, introduction and conclusion of the paper.  
 
The paper “Organizational Ambidexterity and Family Firm Performance” marks the 
transition of the research focus from scenario planning to strategic management 
                                                          
2 VHB Jourqual D 
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research in family firms. It introduces the concept of organizational ambidexterity 
(OA) to family firm research and empirically tests a set of hypotheses on the 
impact of family influence on OA and private family firm performance. The study 
demonstrates that as family influence increases, family firms achieve higher 
degrees of OA and subsequent firm performance. Especially the family power and 
cultural alignment dimensions lead to higher degrees of OA and firm performance. 
The paper contributes both to strategic management and family firm research by 
combining the two fields and introducing OA to the controversial debate on family 
firm heterogeneity and private family firm performance. Moreover, the paper 
shows that the strategic concept of ambidexterity is also valid in the confined 
context of German family firms.  
 
The paper, which his co-authored by Stephan Stubner, W. Henning Blarr and 
Torsten Wulf has been published in the Journal of Small Business and 
Entrepreneurship, Vol. 25(2), 2012, pp. 217-229.3 It was previously presented 
following a successful double-blind review process at the 11th European Academy 
of Management Conference (EURAM) in Tallinn, Estonia in 2011 and the 11th 
Annual IFERA World Family Business Research Conference 2011 in Palermo, 
Italy. The author’s main contribution is the development of the paper’s structure as 
well as theoretical link of OA to the family firm research context. Additionally, the 
author contributed significantly to the revision of the paper as part of the 
publication process with the Journal of Small Business and Entrepreneurship.  
 
The final paper “The Impact of Successor Generation Discount in Family Firms: 
Examining Nonlinear Effects on Exploration and Exploitation” is a theoretical and 
empirical extension of the research on strategies adopted by family firms in order 
to obtain a sustaining competitive advantage. It contributes to the debate on 
generational involvement in family firms and its impact on two orientations present 
in the strategic management literature: capability exploration and resource 
exploitation. Based on a set of 125 German family firms the paper shows that as 
                                                          
3 VHB Jourqual C 
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the generation involved in managing a family firm increases, the level of 
exploration decreases. At the same time the level of exploitation of existing 
resources rises to a point where efficiency improvements no longer lead to 
performance advantages. Based on the resource-based view and insights from the 
family firm literature the paper thus shows that – on the one hand – a U-shaped 
relationship exists between generational involvement in family firms’ management 
and the level of exploration and – on the other hand – an inverse U-shaped 
relationship can be found between generational involvement in family firms’ 
management and the level of exploitation. The study offers distinct insights with 
family firms applying different rent creation mechanisms during different 
generational stages suggesting a high difficulty for firms to simultaneously pursue 
an exploration of new opportunities and exploitation of existing resources.  
 
The paper is co-authored with Torsten Wulf and was presented at the 9th 
Workshop on Family Firm Management Research 2013 by the European Institute 
for Advanced Studies in Management (EIASM) in Helsinki. The paper is currently 
prepared to be submitted to a family firm research journal. The author’s main 
contribution to the paper is the development of the research idea, research design, 
the theoretical development of hypotheses as well as their empirical testing. 
Moreover the author has integrated research on the unique generational effect 
present in family firms with the resource-based view and a firm’s rent seeking 
mechanism establishing a sustained competitive advantage.  
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Dissertation Results 
This dissertation introduces an interdisciplinary research design integrating 
scenario planning and strategic management in family firms. By providing both 
academics and practitioners with a detailed overview of an innovative approach to 
scenario-based strategic planning and transferring this approach to the corporate 
finance function, the thesis provides insights on how companies can cope with a 
complex, uncertain and volatile business environment. Moreover, the thesis 
bridges the gap between scenario planning and strategic management in family 
firms providing empirical support how family influence helps family firms to attain a 
higher level of organizational ambidexterity and performance thus helping to 
sustain their competitive advantage.  
 
Additionally, the thesis introduces empirical support for the generational effect 
present in family firms suggesting that family firms apply different rent creation 
mechanisms during different generational stages to sustain a competitive 
advantage. These results help both academia, corporate and family firm 
management alike to better understand how scenario planning helps to cope with 
complexity and uncertainty and which strategies can be adopted by family firm 
managers over different life-cycle stages to increase performance. It thus supports 
achieving the ultimate goal of strategic management, creating and sustaining a 
competitive advantage (Figure 2).  
 
2.1. Contribution 
The presented six tools for scenario-based strategic planning contribute to existing 
research on strategic management and scenario planning by offering a detailed 
explanation how scenario planning can easily be integrated into a company’s 
strategic planning activities through applying the six tools. The six tools overcome 
the often criticized complexity associated with scenario planning in companies 
(Millet, 2003; Moyer, 1996). Moreover, the approach and the six tools help 
companies to better cope with volatile, complex and uncertain business 
environments. It thus closes the research gap asking for more visionary strategic 
management tools capable of integrating outside perspectives rather than 
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for the finance function to develop specific strategies based on scenarios 
(Bradfield, Wright, Burt, Cairns, & van der Heijden, 2005). The approach and the 
transfer of the six tools to the finance function closes this gap by explaining in 
detail how corporate planners can cope with volatile revenue streams using the six 
tools.  
 
The thesis thus contributes to the strategic management literature and calls for a 
better understanding how complexity, volatility and uncertainty can be anticipated 
and managed in companies leading to a sustained competitive advantage.  
 
By transferring the findings on how firms can sustain a competitive advantage 
through scenario planning and strategic management to family firm research this 
dissertation contributes to the research domain calling for a strategic management 
perspective examining how family firms attain a competitive advantage when 
conducting research on family firms (Sharma, Chrisman, & Chua, 1997). This 
dissertation makes a first step towards integrating the two fields, strategic 
management and family firm research, by being the first to introduce the strategy 
concept of organizational ambidexterity (OA) to family firm research. Through the 
development of hypotheses examining the impact of family influence on OA and 
subsequent family firm performance and testing them in an empirical research 
design, the thesis combines and summarizes the two research streams (Zahra & 
Sharma, 2004). The result showing that family influence leads to higher level of 
ambidexterity through family power and culture alignment and that a higher level of 
ambidexterity in family firms leads to a higher performance provides a better 
understanding how family firms achieve a competitive advantage. Moreover, the 
thesis makes a clear theoretical contribution by providing an approach for 
integrating strategic management and family firm research which can be adopted 
by other researchers from both fields.  
 
In addition, this thesis provides insights on the generational involvement in family 
firms and its impact on two important strategies for creating a competitive 
advantage: new capability exploration and resource exploitation. It thus empirically 
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contributes to the family firm research debate on the strategies pursued by 
successful dynastic family enterprises as to how they engage in a continuous 
cycle of capability exploration and resource exploitation (Sharma & Salvato, 2011). 
The results provide significant theoretical insights for family firm researchers as 
the pursuit of capability exploration and resource exploitation does not take place 
simultaneously, but follows a non-linear distribution over different family 
generations managing the family business. Additionally, the findings provide family 
firm managers with a clear indication when to adapt the right strategic focus on 
capability exploration or resource exploitation depending on which family 
generation currently manages the family firm. Finally a contribution is made to the 
strategic management literature by using the family firm context to enrich the 
debate on strategies pursued by companies to create a competitive advantage. 
Our results provide a more fine-tuned analysis on the creation of a competitive 
advantage as firms tend to use different strategies depending on the life-cycle 
stages they are in rather than pursuing different strategies simultaneously.  
 
These contributions to the growing literature on strategic management in family 
firms responding to calls asking to conduct more empirical research in the family 
firm context examining the different strategies adopted by family firms to attain a 
competitive advantage.  
 
Summarizing, this dissertation presents six tools to be used as part of a scenario-
based strategic planning process leading to a sustained competitive advantage. It 
proves the tools’ relevance by transferring them to the corporate context and 
highlighting their practicality when conducting strategic management projects in 
volatile, uncertain and complex business environments. The pursuit of attaining a 
competitive advantage is empirically transferred to the family firm research context 
by integrating family firm and strategic management research describing different 
strategies pursued by family firms to preserve their competitive advantage.  
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2.2. Implications and Further Research 
The dissertation’s results have a high relevance for strategic management and 
family firm research as well as corporate practice. The first two papers, “Six-Tools 
for Scenario-Based Strategic Planning and Their Application” and 
“Szenariobasierte Strategische Planung in Volatilen Umfeldern” introduce and 
refine six tools to the strategic management and scenario planning literature 
allowing for a better understanding of complexity, volatility and uncertainty as part 
of strategic management practices.  
 
Particularly the six tools of the approach to scenario-based strategic planning can 
initiate a new, more elaborate discussion on the benefits of strategic management 
in general and strategic planning in particular. A first step towards analyzing the 
benefits of the six tools has already been made in the second paper of the 
dissertation where they are applied in the corporate and financial planning context. 
Yet, the debate could move one step further by adapting the six tools and linking 
the scenarios and their outcomes to managerial accounting, i.e. flexible budgeting 
processes such as rolling budgets. The advantage of such research would be a 
further refinement of the approach to scenario-based strategic planning and a 
further integration of research on strategic planning and managerial accounting.  
 
Moreover, combining strategy and managerial accounting research through the 
scenario-based approach to strategic planning could also lead to a more precise 
analysis on how companies actually achieve a competitive advantage. As 
mentioned in the first paragraph, the basic definition of a competitive advantage 
posits that a firm with a competitive advantage earns a persistently higher rate of 
profit, or has the potential to earn a persistently higher rate of profit (Mintzberg, 
1994). Yet, strategic management research so far has not yet managed to quantify 
the costs involved in attaining a competitive advantage and the exact benefits 
going beyond pure profits associated with it. A quantification of scenarios derived 
through a scenario-based strategic planning activity and their linkage with 
accounting tools such a company’s profit and loss account or balance sheet could 
close this research gap.  
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The papers “Organizational Ambidexterity and Family Firm Performance” and “The 
Impact of Successor Generation Discount in Family Firms: Examining Nonlinear 
Effects on Exploration and Exploitation” empirically analyze the strategies used by 
family firms to attain a competitive advantage further enhance the understanding 
of strategic management in a particular context. The concept of organizational 
ambidexterity is of significant relevance in the strategic management context as it 
describes a highly relevant strategic dilemma of firms pursuing a competitive 
advantage, namely the strive of organizations to pursue two different approaches 
at the same time: they have a strong exploitative orientation to improve the 
performance of current business activities, e.g. through higher efficiency (March, 
1991) as well as an explorative orientation geared toward innovation and flexible 
operations to develop and harvest future business opportunities (Tushman & 
O'Reilly III, 1996). 
 
The dissertation introduces organizational ambidexterity to the family firm context 
and shows how family influence leads to higher levels of ambidexterity and 
subsequent higher performance. However, further analysis to validate and fine-
tune the relationship between organizational ambidexterity and performance in 
family could lead to more detailed results on how exactly family influence leads to 
a higher level of ambidexterity. Especially the social and emotional aspects of 
family businesses and the relationship among family members as well as between 
the family and the business are a promising domain for further research in this 
area. Moreover, this promising research stream is also in line with recent findings 
in the strategic management literature suggest that a strong organizational culture 
or firm values are more important in achieving a competitive advantage than the 
actual process of developing a strategy (Jarzabkowski & Balogun, 2009). Family 
firms in general provide a strong organizational context with positive firm values 
making them a suitable domain to further study how companies attain a 
competitive advantage.  
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With the empirical analysis of organizational ambidexterity in German family firms 
this dissertation makes a first contribution on the strategic orientations pursued by 
family firms. However, organizational ambidexterity is a complex construct with 
different types of ambidexterity such as structural or behavioral ambidexterity 
(Simsek, 2009). Further research should take these different types of 
organizational ambidexterity into account as they might provide further insights on 
how family firms actually achieve a competitive advantage through structural 
ambidexterity.  
 
These findings of the dissertation also have implications for corporate managers. 
They highlight the special role of family firms in attaining high levels of 
ambidexterity and further demonstrate the positive performance impact achieved 
by having an ambidextrous organization. Family firm managers aiming to increase 
their business’s performance can thus analyze their organization’s strategy 
aligning relevant activities towards a more ambidextrous focus which should 
eventually result in a competitive advantage.  
 
The dissertation’s final paper continues the debate on strategic management in 
family firms by focusing on the impact a family generation managing the family firm 
has on new capability exploration and resource exploitation. The paper has strong 
implications for both academia as well as practitioners. It is commonly known and 
empirically proven that a mere ten percent of first generation family businesses 
successfully transition to the third generation (Kellermanns & Eddleston, 2004). 
This dissertation contributes to this debate by providing insights on the degree of 
capability exploration and resource exploitation present in family firms depending 
on which generation controls the firm’s management. Going beyond the fact that 
the findings of the dissertation show a U-shaped relationship between generational 
involvement in family firms and the level of exploration with the minimum point 
being during the second generation, and an inverse U-shaped relationship 
between generational involvement and the level of exploitation with the maximum 
point being during the third generation managing the family business, it answers a 
specific research call asking for a more fine grained analysis of explorative and 
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exploitative strategies in family firms (Sharma & Salvato, 2011). This finding has 
implications for research scholars and practitioners alike. Research scholars so far 
have assumed that capability exploration and resource exploitation take place 
simultaneously. Our results obtained in the German family firm context suggest 
otherwise. A further analysis on how family firms explore capabilities and exploit 
resources, ideally in a different geographic setting is thus needed to provide 
further evidence for our results. Moreover, given the empirical nature of the 
research design adopted in this dissertation, it is still not clear how exactly family 
firms explore capabilities and exploit resources. A qualitative study could provide 
further insights on this research question.  
 
From a practitioners perspective this dissertation might answer the question why 
most family firms fail to make a successful transition into the third generation over 
the lifecycle of a family business: The level of exploitation increases too quickly 
with the level of exploration decreasing at the same time reaching its minimum 
during the third generation managing the firm. Our results suggest that only those 
firms making a quick transition and refocus on exploration make it beyond the third 
generation. Family firm managers aware of this finding can thus adopt the relevant 
strategic orientation at the right time. With this result in mind family managers 
might disprove the common notation that wealth does not pass three generations.  
 
In summary this thesis implies for corporate practice that scenario-based strategic 
planning including the six tools is a useful tool for managing complex, uncertain 
and volatile business environments. Furthermore, it provides insights on how 
scenario-based strategic planning can help corporate and financial planners to 
cope with unforeseen challenges potentially putting their company’s competitive 
advantage at risk. For family firm mangers this thesis suggests to revisit the 
strategies in place focusing on exploration and exploitation since a combination of 
both might lead to a higher performance. Moreover family firm managers and 
owners should keep in mind which generation is currently managing the firm since 
different family generations have different priorities regarding of firm’s tendency 
Scenario-Based Strategic Planning and Strategic Management in Family Firms  
20 
towards capability exploration and resource exploitation potentially putting the 
firm’s existence at risk.   
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II. SIX TOOLS FOR SCENARIO-BASED STRATEGIC PLANNING AND 
THEIR APPLICATION 
 
Paper A 
 
Published in  
Schwenker, B. and Wulf, T. (Eds.), 2013. Scenario-based Strategic Planning: 
Developing Strategies in an Uncertain World. pp. 69-153, Springer Gabler: 
Wiesbaden, Germany 
 
Christian Brands, Torsten Wulf and Philip Meissner 
 
Abstract 
 
Scenario planning has often been criticized for the complexity that arises when it is 
grafted into a company's overall strategic planning process. To overcome this 
deficiency, we have developed the HHL-Roland Berger scenario-based approach 
to strategic planning. This paper explains each tool of the approach in detail, 
evaluates its practicability and demonstrates how executives can immediately 
apply the entire toolkit within their overall strategic planning process. To facilitate 
the application of the tools, each step is explained using a practical example from 
the European airline industry. Taken together, the detailed explanations that follow 
present a scenario-based strategic planning framework that can help companies 
cope with an uncertain, complex and volatile business environment.  
 
  
Six Tools for Scenario-Based Strategic Planning and Their Application  
26 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This article has been published as part of the book “Scenario-based Strategic 
Planning: Developing Strategies in an Uncertain World”, edited by Burkhard 
Schwenker and Torsten Wulf, pp. 69-153. 
(ISBN 978-3-658-02874-9; 2013; Springer Gabler: Wiesbaden, Germany). 
For copyright reasons, pages 27-110 were excluded from this version of my 
dissertation. 
Further information on the book can be found here:  
http://www.springer.com/springer+gabler/management/unternehmensführung/book/978-3-658-02874-9 
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III. SZENARIOBASIERTE STRATEGISCHE PLANUNG IN VOLATILEN 
UMFELDERN 
 
Paper B 
 
Veröffentlicht in  
Controlling & Management, 2012, 56, Sonderheft 2, Seiten 34-38. 
 
Torsten Wulf, Stephan Stubner, Philip Meissner und Christian Brands 
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1365/s12176-012-0380-z 
 
 
Abstract 
Unternehmen suchen verstärkt nach Instrumenten, die sie bei der Planung in 
zunehmen volatileren und komplexeren Umwelten einsetzen können. Klassische 
Ansätze der strategischen Planung sind in diesem Kontext nicht offen genug, um 
dynamischen Änderungen in der Zukunft zu planen. Auch die sehr offene 
Szenarioplanung ist für Unternehmen nur bedingt geeignet, da sie zeit- und 
ressourcenaufwändig ist und nicht die Entwicklung von konkreten 
Handlungsempfehlungen zum Ziel hat. Eine Lösung stellt die szenariobasierte 
strategische Planung dar, die Unternehmen ermöglicht, mit Hilfe von 
standardisierten Instrumenten sehr flexibel zu planen und konkrete 
Strategieoptionen für zukünftige Umweltänderungen zu entwickeln.  
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1. Einführung: Unternehmen agieren in einer zunehmend volatilen Umwelt  
Eine der größten Herausforderungen für die strategische Planung in Unternehmen 
stellt heutzutage die zunehmende Volatilität und Komplexität der Umwelt dar. 
Gerade in den letzten Jahren ist zu beobachten, dass diese Entwicklung sich 
verstärkt und die Unsicherheit bei der Planung von zukünftigen Ereignissen 
erhöht. Als ein Symptom für zunehmende Volatilität gelten zum Beispiel die immer 
kürzer werdenden Zyklen zwischen großen Wirtschaftskrisen. So haben Bordo et 
al. (2001) in ihrer Studie festgestellt, dass sich die Frequenz solcher Ereignisse 
seit 1973 verdoppelt hat. Schocks wie die Ölkrise von 1973, die Asienkrise von 
1997, das Platzen der Internetblase in 2001 oder auch die letzte Finanzkrise in 
2008 zeigen, wie volatil und schwer vorhersagbar wirtschaftliche Entwicklungen 
geworden sind. Verschärft werden die Auswirkungen wachsender Volatilität durch 
die zunehmende Dynamik im Wirtschaftsgeschehen. Allein in der 
Automobilbranche haben sich die Innovationszyklen in den letzten drei 
Jahrzehnten von durchschnittlich elf auf weniger als sechs Jahre verkürzt. Und 
auch die fortschreitende Senkung von Transaktionskosten durch neue Technolo-
gien und die zunehmend offenen Grenzen zwischen Wirtschaftszonen tragen dazu 
bei, dass sich Unternehmen heute in einer immer komplexeren Umwelt bewegen 
(Schwenker & Boetzel, 2007).  
 
2. Volatilität als Herausforderung für die strategische Planung 
Wenn sich Unternehmen in dieser Situation strukturiert Gedanken über ihre 
zukünftige Ausrichtung machen, zählt auch heute noch die traditionelle 
strategische Planung zu einem der dominanten Instrumente (Rigby & Bilodeau, 
2007). Bei dieser traditionellen strategischen Planung wird üblicherweise auf Basis 
einer internen und einer externen Analyse eine Strategie bestimmt, mit welcher 
das Unternehmen mittel- bis langfristig Wettbewerbsvorteile entwickeln und sich 
auf dem Markt behaupten will. Dieser klassische Ansatz ist aber nicht geeignet, 
um Unternehmen bei zunehmender Volatilität und Umweltdynamik ausreichend zu 
unterstützen (Dyer, Johansson, Helbing, Couzin, & Krause, 2009; Mintzberg, 
1994b). Dies liegt zum einen daran, dass in einem formalen strategischen 
Planungsprozess, für den traditionelle Strategieinstrumente entwickelt worden 
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sind, in der Regel relativ kontinuierliche Umweltveränderungen betrachtet werden. 
Damit fehlt die Offenheit, um auf diskontinuierliche Veränderungen oder starke 
Schwankungen im Umfeld zu reagieren (Mintzberg, 1994a). In der Kritik steht aber 
der Fokus traditioneller Ansätze auf nur eine einzige zukünftige 
Entwicklungsrichtung (Eisenhardt & Sull, 2001; Grant, 2003). Auch in der 
Unternehmenspraxis reift zunehmend die Erkenntnis, dass in dynamischen, 
komplexen und volatilen Umfeldern traditionelle Ansätze der strategischen 
Planung nur eingeschränkt geeignet sind (Ramirez, Selsky, & van der Heijden, 
2008). Daher suchen viele Unternehmen aktiv nach neuen Ansätzen, welche die 
Offenheit und Flexibilität des strategischen Denkens stärker in den Vordergrund 
stellen als traditionelle Ansätze.  
 
Insbesondere müssen solche Ansätze es ermöglichen, nicht nur eine mögliche 
Zukunft abzubilden, sondern vielmehr einen Optionenraum in der Planung zu 
erfassen (Miller, 2008). Zudem sollten solche Ansätze verschiedene interne und 
externe Perspektiven einbinden, um sicherzustellen, dass möglichst viele Aspekte 
einer immer komplexer werdenden und dynamischeren Umwelt berücksichtigt 
werden können (Elbanna/Child 2007). Schließlich sollten entsprechende Ansätze 
auch schnell und flexibel einsetzbar sein, um in volatilen Umfeldern schnell 
reagieren zu können (Dyer et al., 2009).  
 
Oft versuchen Unternehmen, dies durch die Anwendung der Szenarioplanung zu 
erreichen (Dyer et al., 2009; Grant, 2003). Die Szenarioplanung deckt viele der 
aufgezeigten Anforderungen ab. Sie ermöglicht die Betrachtung verschiedener 
Entwicklungen der Zukunft und erlaubt dadurch einen besseren Umgang mit 
Unsicherheit und Volatilität (Grant, 2003; Porter, 1985; Schoemaker, 1995). 
Gerade in den letzten Jahren hat die Szenarioplanung daher in der Praxis wieder 
stärker an Bedeutung gewonnen.  
 
Allerdings kann auch die klassische Szenarioplanung nicht alle Anforderungen an 
die strategische Planung in volatilen Umfeldern erfüllen und ist mit einigen 
Nachteilen verbunden. Gerade weil sie das Ziel hat, das offene Nachdenken über 
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zukünftige Entwicklungen zu fördern, wird sie oft ohne methodische Unterstützung 
durchgeführt. So mangelt es den meisten Ansätzen zur Szenarioplanung an 
standardisierten Methoden, die auch ohne Expertenunterstützung umgesetzt 
werden können (Chermack, Lynham, & Ruona, 2001). Dadurch ist der Prozess in 
der Regel komplex, umständlich, langwierig in seiner Anwendung und bindet viele 
interne Ressourcen im Unternehmen (Bradfield, 2008). Dies führt unter anderem 
dazu, dass Szenarioprojekte oft mehr als fünf Monate in Anspruch nehmen 
(Moyer, 1996; Shell, 2003). Nicht zuletzt können damit auch die Qualität von 
Szenarioprozessen und deren Ergebnisse sehr stark schwanken (Schwartz, 
1996). Zudem erschwert der Fokus auf eher langfristige Entwicklungen die 
Anwendung im strategischen Kontext, der vornehmlich Zeiträume von weniger als 
fünf Jahren betrachtet (Schwartz, 1996). Schließlich zielt die Szenarioplanung 
weniger auf die Entwicklung von konkreten Strategien und Umsetzungsplänen ab, 
als vielmehr auf die Diskussion der eigentlichen Simulationen und Szenarien und 
der Entwicklungspfade, die zu diesen Szenarien führen (Bishop, Hines, & Collins, 
2007). Dadurch wird die Handhabbarkeit der Szenarioplanung als Instrument der 
strategischen Planung stark eingeschränkt. Diese Nachteile der Szenarioplanung 
führen dazu, dass sie in ihrer traditionellen Form für Strategieplaner nur 
eingeschränkt zu empfehlen ist. 
 
3. Szenariobasierte strategische Planung als Lösungsansatz für Planung 
unter Volatilität 
 
3.1. Grundlagen der szenariobasierten strategischen Planung 
 
Ein Ansatz, der darauf abzielt, die Vorteile der Szenarioplanung zu nutzen und 
ihre Nachteile zu vermeiden, ist der von uns entwickelte Ansatz der 
szenariobasierten strategischen Planung (Wulf, Meissner, & Stubner, 2010). Er 
ermöglicht die strukturierte, methodisch unterstützte Einbindung von Szenarien in 
den strategischen Planungsprozess, ist für Unternehmen einfach handhabbar und 
liefert umsetzbare Erkenntnisse. Die szenariobasierte strategische Planung folgt 
einem sechsstufigen Prozess, in den viele Aspekte der klassischen 
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mentalen Modelle der Entscheidungsträger im Unternehmen in Bezug auf die Ent-
wicklungen der eigenen Branche zu erfassen. Dafür haben wir das Instrument 
„360°-Stakeholder-Feedback“ entwickelt (Wulf, Krys, Brands, Meissner, & Stubner, 
2011). Im Rahmen der Wahrnehmungsanalyse werden interne und externe 
Anspruchsgruppen in den strategischen Planungsprozess eingebunden. Zu den 
internen Anspruchsgruppen zählen typischerweise die Unternehmensführung, 
Vertreter des Bereichs Unternehmensstrategie bzw. Unternehmensentwicklung 
und die Leiter wichtiger Funktionsbereiche bzw. Sparten. Als externe 
Anspruchsgruppen können z.B. Lieferanten, Kreditgeber, Gesellschafter, Vertreter 
von Gewerkschaften, Kunden, Wettbewerber, Spezialisten aus Verbänden und 
Forschungseinrichtungen oder Szenarioexperten berücksichtigt werden. In der 
Regel werden zwischen 40 und 100 Experten befragt. Besonders wichtig ist es 
jedoch, dass der Kreis der ausgewählten Personen möglichst weit gefasst ist, um 
eine möglichst große Bandbreite von Sichtweisen auf die Branche und das 
Unternehmen zu erfassen. Die Wahrnehmungsanalyse trägt damit zu einer 
„Öffnung“ der strategischen Planung bei und vermeidet eine enge, 
unternehmensbezogene Sichtweise im Planungsprozess, die gerade bei hoher 
Umweltvolatilität sehr schädlich sein kann.  
 
Die Vertreter der unterschiedlichen Anspruchsgruppen werden in einem zweistufi-
gen Prozess gebeten, wichtige Einflussfaktoren für die Entwicklung des 
Unternehmens bzw. der Branche über den Planungszeitraum – üblicherweise drei 
bis fünf Jahre – zu nennen und diese Faktoren nach dem Grad ihrer Unsicherheit, 
d.h. danach, wie vorhersehbar die zukünftige Ausprägung der Faktoren ist, und 
nach ihrem Einfluss auf die zukünftige Profitabilität des Unternehmens zu 
bewerten. Ergebnis des 360° Stakeholder Feedbacks ist dann zunächst ein 
umfassender Überblick über die wichtigsten Einflussfaktoren, die die zukünftige 
Entwicklung des Unternehmens bzw. der Branche prägen.  
 
Noch bedeutender ist jedoch gerade in volatilen Umfeldern ein zweites Ergebnis 
des 360° Stakeholder Feedbacks. So erlaubt das Instrument die Identifikation von 
so genannten „blinden Flecken“ (blind spots) und „schwachen Signalen“ (weak 
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signals). Als blinde Flecken werden Faktoren bezeichnet, die interne als 
wesentlich weniger bedeutend bzw. unsicher einschätzen als externe 
Anspruchsgruppen. Sie können ein Indikator für eine verengte Sichtweise – eben 
für „Blindheit“ – des Unternehmens für wichtige Einflüsse und Veränderungen im 
externen Umfeld sein. Schwache Signale sind dagegen solche Faktoren, die von 
nur sehr wenigen, meist externen Befragten genannt werden und die erste 
Indikatoren für wichtige Veränderungen im Umfeld des Unternehmens sein 
können. Blinde Flecken und schwache Signale zu erkennen und im Rahmen des 
strategischen Planungsprozesses zu diskutieren, dient dazu, den Blickwinkel des 
Managements zu erweitern, und ist so eine wichtige Grundlage für das Ableiten 
von erfolgreichen Strategien gerade in volatilen Umfeldern.  
 
Im Rahmen einer szenariobasierten strategischen Analyse für den 
Elektronikeinzelhandel in Deutschland haben wir unter anderem festgestellt, dass 
die etablierten Elektronikhändler die Verfügbarkeit von Online-Preisvergleichen, 
durch die es für Kunden möglich ist, direkt vor Ort die günstigsten 
Beschaffungsmöglichkeiten für ein Elektrogerät zu ermitteln, stark unterschätzt 
haben (Wulf et al., 2012). Dieser Einflussfaktor stellt daher für etablierte Händler 
einen blinden Fleck dar. Angesichts der Volatilität in der Branche und eines 
zunehmenden Wettbewerbs zwischen „online“ und „offline“ Handel erscheint die 
Berücksichtigung dieses Einflussfaktors im Rahmen der strategischen Planung 
jedoch unumgänglich, und das 360° Stakeholder Feedback hat zu einer Öffnung 
des Denkens des Managements der betroffenen Händler beigetragen.  
 
Im dritten Schritt der szenariobasierten strategischen Planung, der Trend-und Un-
sicherheitsanalyse, werden die Ergebnisse der Wahrnehmungsanalyse entlang 
von zwei Dimensionen visualisiert. Dafür wird auf das Instrument des 
Impact/Uncertainty Grid zurückgegriffen, um so genannte sekundäre Elemente, 
relevante Trends und kritische Unsicherheiten zu identifizieren. Das 
Impact/Uncertainty Grid hilft dabei, die Liste der Faktoren aus den 360° Stake-
holder Feedbacks zu strukturieren und zu priorisieren. Es wurde bereits in den 
1970er Jahren von Kees van der Heijden für den Szenarioplanungsprozess bei 
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Royal Dutch Shell entwickelt und findet seitdem breite Anwendung in 
Szenarioprozessen (van't Klooster & van Asselt, 2006).  
 
Unter sekundären Elementen werden in diesem Zusammenhang alle Faktoren 
verstanden, die nur einen untergeordneten Einfluss auf die 
Unternehmensentwicklung besitzen. Zur Komplexitätsreduktion werden sie aus 
der weiteren Betrachtung im Prozess ausgeschlossen. Als Trends werden jene 
Faktoren bezeichnet, die einen verhältnismäßig großen Einfluss auf das 
Unternehmen besitzen, deren zukünftige Entwicklung jedoch gleichzeitig mit 
relativ großer Sicherheit vorhersehbar ist. Als kritische Unsicherheiten werden 
dagegen Faktoren bezeichnet, die einen großen Einfluss auf den zukünftigen 
Erfolg des Unternehmens haben und deren Entwicklung gleichzeitig unsicher ist. 
Diese Faktoren können auch als die wesentlichen Treiber für die Volatilität im 
Unternehmensumfeld angesehen werden. In der praktischen Anwendung des 
Instruments zeigt sich, dass meist nicht mehr als drei bis fünf kritische 
Unsicherheiten, d.h. Volatilitätshebel, identifiziert werden können.  
 
So haben wir beispielsweise bei einer Szenarioanalyse der europäischen Luftver-
kehrsbranche festgestellt, dass aus Sicht der traditionellen 
Netzwerkfluggesellschaften in Europa – wie Lufthansa oder Air France-KLM – die 
geopolitische Stabilität, das Wirtschaftswachstum in Kernmärkten, der politische 
Einfluss von Luftverkehrsgesellschaften sowie Kundenerwartungen hinsichtlich 
Preis und Service die wichtigsten kritischen Unsicherheiten – und damit 
Volatilitätstreiber – darstellen (Wulf, Meissner, Brands, & Maul, 2011). Zur 
Entwicklung von Szenarien im folgenden Schritt des Prozesses der 
szenariobasierten strategischen Planung müssen diese kritischen Unsicherheiten 
zu zwei so genannten Schlüsselunsicherheiten verdichtet werden (van der 
Heijden, 2005). Als solche Schlüsselunsicherheiten bzw. verdichteten 
Volatilitätstreiber haben wir für die europäische Luftverkehrsindustrie die 
Regulierung der Branche in Europa sowie die Preissensibilität der Kundenbasis 
ermittelt (Wulf & Maul, 2011). 
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Die Entwicklung von vier Szenarien steht im Mittelpunkt des vierten Schrittes 
unseres Prozesses der szenariobasierten strategischen Planung, der 
Szenarioentwicklung. Dafür wird das von Kees van der Hejiden (2002) entwickelte 
Instrument der Szenariomatrix eingesetzt (van't Klooster & van Asselt, 2006). 
Diese Matrix bildet in ihren vier Quadranten jeweils ein Entwicklungsszenario für 
das Unternehmen ab. Als Dimensionen der Szenariomatrix dienen die im vorange-
gangenen Prozessschritt abgeleiteten Schlüsselunsicherheiten, d.h. die verdich-
teten Volatilitätstreiber, für die jeweils Extremausprägungen definiert werden. 
Entlang dieser Dimensionen werden vier Szenarien beschrieben. Als Grundlage 
für diese Beschreibung dient das so genannte Einflussdiagramm, in dem die 
Zusammenhänge zwischen Trends, kritischen Unsicherheiten und 
Schlüsselunsicherheiten aufgezeigt werden. Letztlich verdeutlichen die Szenarien 
die Bandbreite möglicher Entwicklungen und damit die Volatilität, der sich das 
Unternehmen ausgesetzt sieht.  
 
So haben wir beispielsweise im Rahmen der beschriebenen Szenariostudie für die 
europäische Luftverkehrsbranche als wichtigste Ausprägungen der Volatilität in 
der Branche eine sinkende bzw. steigende Preissensibilität der Kunden sowie eine 
offene bzw. protektionistische Regulierung in Europa identifiziert. Daraus leiten 
sich vier Szenarien ab, die im Überblick in Abbildung 37 dargestellt sind (Wulf & 
Maul, 2011).  
 
Für die vier Szenarien werden im fünften Schritt des Prozesses der szenarioba-
sierten strategischen Planung, der Strategiedefinition, konkrete Strategien und 
Handlungspläne erarbeitet. Hierfür haben wir das Instrument des 
Strategieleitfadens entwickelt. Im Rahmen des Strategieleitfadens werden 
zunächst für jedes Szenario spezifische Strategieempfehlungen hinsichtlich 
Positionierung, Gestaltung des Geschäftssystems und operativer Umsetzung 
abgeleitet. Anschließend wird geprüft, inwieweit Übereinstimmungen zwischen 
den Strategieempfehlungen für die vier Szenarien bestehen. Die in allen Fällen 
gleichen Empfehlungen ergeben dann die Kernstrategie, welche das 
Unternehmen in jedem Fall umsetzen kann, da sie von der konkreten zukünftigen 
Szenariob
Entwicklu
Szenarie
Unterneh
umgesetz
betreffend
 
 
Abbildung
 
Ergebnis 
zelne Str
Komplexi
die Anwe
Strategie
grundsätz
in der jew
beispielsw
Netzwerk
asierte Stra
ng unabh
n untersc
men in se
t werden,
en Szena
 39: Szenar
der szena
ategien, z
tät der str
ndung de
empfehlun
lichen Au
eiligen Be
eise aus 
fluggesells
tegische Pla
ängig ist
heiden, w
iner Planu
 wenn die 
rios führt. 
ien für die eu
riobasiert
wischen d
ategische
r szenario
gen für 
srichtung 
tonung ei
unserer A
chaften tr
nung in Vola
. Strategi
erden al
ng berück
tatsächlic
 
ropäische L
en strateg
enen ein
n Planung
basierten 
untersc
sehr ähnli
nzelner St
nalyse de
otz der Vo
tilen Umfeld
eempfehlu
s Strateg
sichtigen 
he Umwel
uftverkehrsb
ischen Pl
 Unterneh
 deutlich 
strategisc
hiedliche 
ch sind. U
rategieele
r europäis
latilität ihr
ern  
ngen, die
ieoptionen
muss, die
tentwicklu
ranche bis 2
anung sin
men wäh
erhöhen w
hen Planu
Szenarie
nterschied
mente und
chen Luftv
er Umfeld
 sich zw
 behande
 aber in d
ng in die R
015 im Übe
d somit n
len muss 
ürden. Vi
ng in der 
n häufig
e besteh
 Maßnahm
erkehrsin
er, die sic
1
ischen d
lt, die d
er Regel n
ichtung d
rblick 
icht vier e
und die d
elmehr ze
Praxis, da
 in ih
en meist n
en. So fo
dustrie, da
h in den v
20 
en 
as 
ur 
es 
 
in-
ie 
igt 
ss 
rer 
ur 
lgt 
ss 
ier 
Szenariobasierte Strategische Planung in Volatilen Umfeldern  
121 
Szenarien äußert, in jedem Fall eine strategische Ausrichtung auf folgende drei 
Felder anstreben sollten:  
 
1 Sie müssen Programme zur Effizienzsteigerung weiterführen, die ihnen hel-
fen, ihre im Vergleich zu europäischen Billigfluggesellschaften und 
asiatischen Wettbewerbern ungünstige Kostensituation zu verbessern.  
2 Sie müssen kundenorientierte Innovationen in allen Bereichen des 
Geschäftssystems vorantreiben, um insbesondere im Wettbewerb mit 
asiatischen Konkurrenten weiter mithalten zu können, aber auch um 
Billigfluggesellschaften auf Distanz zu halten.  
3 Sie müssen eine verstärkte Lobbyarbeit betreiben, um insbesondere 
asiatischen Wettbewerbern den Marktzugang nach Europa zu erschweren.  
 
Ob alle drei Bereiche gleichmäßig betont werden oder eine 
Schwerpunktverlagerung in die eine oder andere Richtung erfolgen muss, richtet 
sich dann nach der tatsächlichen Entwicklung des Wettbewerbsumfelds, d.h. nach 
dem tatsächlich eintretenden Szenario. Das Schaffen und der Ausbau eigener 
Billigfluggesellschaften kann darüber hinaus als strategische Option angesehen 
werden, die insbesondere bei zunehmendem Wettbewerbsdruck auf europäische 
Netzwerkluftverkehrsgesellschaften von Seiten der Billigfluggesellschaften 
gezogen werden kann.  
 
Welche Elemente der Kernstrategie besonders betont und welche Strategieoptio-
nen gegebenenfalls verfolgt werden, wird im letzten Schritt der szenariobasierten 
strategischen Planung, der kontinuierlichen Kontrolle, festgelegt. Hierfür steht mit 
dem Szenario Cockpit ein Instrument zur Verfügung, das die tatsächliche 
Volatilität der Umwelt, d. h. die Schwankungen bei den kritischen und 
Schlüsselunsicherheiten, erfasst. Dadurch wird deutlich, welches der vier 
Szenarien der realen Entwicklung am ehesten entspricht und welche strategischen 
Maßnahmen dementsprechend durchgeführt werden sollten.  
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4. Zusammenfassung  
Der Prozess der szenariobasierten strategischen Planung stellt einen Ansatz dar, 
mit der Unternehmen angesichts zunehmender Umweltvolatilität besser für die 
Zukunft planen können. Traditionelle Ansätze der strategischen Planung sind in 
solchen Situationen nur eingeschränkt geeignet, da sie in der Regel nur eine 
einzelne strategische Entwicklungsrichtung vorsehen und bei starken 
Veränderungen in der Unternehmensumwelt nur unzureichende 
Anpassungsmöglichkeiten eröffnen. Darüber hinaus tragen traditionelle Instru-
mente der strategischen Planung häufig eher zu einer stärkeren Formalisierung 
der strategischen Planung bei und fördern kein offenes, strategisches Denken, 
das eigentlich im Zentrum der Strategieentwicklung – gerade in volatilen 
Umfeldern – stehen sollte.  
 
Mit der szenariobasierten strategischen Planung stellen wir daher einen Ansatz 
vor, der nicht nur eine einzelne strategische Entwicklungsrichtung vorsieht, 
sondern vielmehr die zunehmende Umweltvolatilität, die viele Branchen heute 
kennzeichnet, aktiv aufgreift und eine strategische Planung für einen durch diese 
Volatilität geprägten Optionenraum ermöglicht. Gleichzeitig fördert dieser Ansatz 
durch die Öffnung der strategischen Planung und die Einbeziehung externer 
Anspruchsgruppen das strategische Denken und ermöglicht dem Management, 
seine eigenen Denkhaltungen zu hinterfragen. Trotz dieser größeren Breite der 
berücksichtigten Entwicklungen und Maßnahmen erhöht die szenariobasierte 
strategische Planung nicht die Planungskomplexität. Vielmehr besteht das 
Ergebnis der szenariobasierten strategischen Planung in einem Bündel 
strategischer Maßnahmen, die in jedem Fall für die Entwicklung des 
Unternehmens positiv sind, die jedoch abhängig von der tatsächlichen Ent-
wicklung der Umwelt eine leicht unterschiedliche Schwerpunktsetzung erfordern. 
Insofern erhöht die szenariobasierte strategische Planung die Flexibilität der 
strategischen Planung. Und dies ist angesichts zunehmend volatiler Umfelder in 
vielen Branchen sehr wünschenswert.  
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Abstract 
In our paper, we introduce the concept of organizational ambidexterity (OA) to 
family firm research and develop hypotheses regarding the impact family influence 
has on OA and on subsequent firm performance. We argue that as family 
influence increases family firms achieve higher degrees of OA and firm 
performance. We empirically test our hypotheses on a dataset of 104 family firms 
and show that family influence leads to higher degrees of ambidexterity especially 
through family power and cultural alignment between family interests and firm 
interests. Furthermore, we show that higher levels of OA in family firms also result 
in better financial performance. We contribute to family firm research by 
introducing organizational ambidexterity into the discussion about family firm 
performance and family firm heterogeneity and thus provide an approach for 
integrating strategy and family firm research. 
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1. Introduction 
In our paper, we analyze the impact of family influence on the level of 
organizational ambidexterity (OA) as well as the subsequent effect of higher levels 
of organizational ambidexterity on family firm performance. Although research on 
the performance impact of family influence is one of the dominant streams in the 
family firm literature (e.g. Chrisman, Chua, & Litz, 2004; Dyer, 2006; Habbershon 
& Williams, 1999; Miller, Le Breton-Miller, Lester, & Cannella Jr, 2007), findings in 
this field are so far inconclusive (Chrisman, Chua, Pearson, & Barnett, 2010; Dyer, 
2006; Rutherford, Kuratko, & Holt, 2008). Many scholars regard the heterogeneity 
of family firms as one reason for this lack of consistent results (Olson et al., 2003). 
They claim that a better understanding of the causes of this heterogeneity is 
needed in order to further develop family performance research (McConaughy 
Daniel, Matthews, & Fialko, 2001). Accordingly, researchers have called for further 
analyses of factors that are responsible for differences among family firms and 
their performance (Melin & Nordqvist, 2007; Sharma, 2004; Westhead & Howorth, 
2006).  
 
We believe that OA is such a factor capable of providing a better understanding of 
the heterogeneity among family firms and resulting performance differences 
(Webb, Ketchen, & Ireland, 2010). The term describes the ability of organizations 
to pursue two different approaches at the same time: they are able to show a 
strong exploitative orientation to improve the performance of current business 
activities, for example, through higher efficiency (March, 1991) as well as an 
explorative orientation geared toward innovation and flexible operations to develop 
and harvest future business opportunities (Tushman & O'Reilly III, 1996). Despite 
the potential positive relationship between OA and family firm performance 
(Chrisman et al., 2010; Dyer, 2006; Rutherford et al., 2008), surprisingly, to the 
best of our knowledge, thus far no scientific study has examined this relationship. 
We argue that because of these organizations’ specific characteristics family firms 
are especially suited for exploring future growth opportunities and exploiting 
current business processes simultaneously (Webb et al., 2010) and that the 
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resulting high level of OA has a positive influence on family firm performance 
(Simsek, 2009; Tushman & O'Reilly III, 1996). 
 
Based on family firm research and literature on OA, we develop a set of 
hypotheses regarding the relationship between family influence and OA and the 
resulting impact on family firm performance. We empirically test our hypotheses on 
a sample of 104 family firms and show that certain elements of family influence 
lead to higher OA, which, in turn, has a positive effect on performance. 
 
Our paper contributes to the literature in two ways. First, we add to existing 
research on family firm characteristics by providing a link between family firms and 
strategic management research  (Zahra & Sharma, 2004). Second, we investigate 
how variables associated with family firms influence affect OA and consequently 
family firm performance. This also broadens the understanding of family firm 
heterogeneity and family firm success.  
 
2. Theory and Hypotheses 
Organizational ambidexterity refers to the ability of firms to simultaneously pursue 
explorative activities that secure future business growth and exploitative activities 
that streamline current operations to maximize profits (Benner & Tushman, 2003). 
Such firms are not only efficient in managing today’s business demands but also 
flexible enough to adapt to changes in the increasingly volatile, uncertain, and 
dynamic environment (Hamel, 2000) to ensure long-term survival (Gibson & 
Birkinshaw, 2004). While focusing on either skill set is conceptually rather easy 
(Tushman & O'Reilly III, 1996), achieving a high level of exploration and 
exploitation at the same time is a complex undertaking as it involves competition 
for scarce resources (Simsek, 2009). Explorative and exploitative activities require 
substantially different, sometimes even conflicting, structures, processes, 
capabilities, and cultures (Sheremata, 2000; Tushman & O'Reilly III, 1996). 
Consequently, conflicts, contradictions, and inconsistencies are predictable. While 
earlier studies often regarded the trade-off necessary to achieve high levels of 
exploration and exploitation as impossible to implement, more recent studies 
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presented a range of solutions to support OA, including structural separation 
(O'Reilly III & Tushman, 2004) and non-structural, context-related elements such 
as culture, values, or mindset (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). We argue that family 
firm characteristics provide an additional perspective to discuss OA. More 
specifically, in family firms two different but mutually influencing systems interact: 
the family system and the firm system (Westhead, 2003). We believe that the 
resulting characteristics of family firms (Casillas, Moreno, & Barbero, 2010), 
especially the influence of the family, enable them to reach a high level of balance 
between exploration for future growth and exploitation of current processes (Webb 
et al., 2010). Family firms are able to create an environment that provides the 
necessary strong focus on performance as well as on social support (Bartlett & 
Ghoshal, 1994). 
 
Based on the F-PEC scale (Astrachan, Klein, & Smyrnios, 2002; Klein, Astrachan, 
& Smyrnios, 2005), we differentiate family influence into three dimensions (family 
power, family experience and family culture) because we believe that all three 
have very distinct, but complementary, effects on OA.  
 
When family firms show a high level of cultural alignment, this means that the 
family is committed to the company and that family and firm goals are aligned 
(Klein et al., 2005). Family firms then often take a long-term perspective (Carney, 
2005; Chrisman, Chua, & Steier, 2003; Habbershon, Williams, & MacMillan, 2003; 
Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2006), as one of the main objectives of the involved 
family is long-term survival, that is, the transfer of the firm to the next generation 
(Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2006; Ward, 1988; Westhead, 2003). The resulting need 
to develop an entrepreneurial mindset to explore new opportunities (Ireland, Hitt, & 
Sirmon, 2003; Kellermanns & Eddleston, 2006) is supported by their goal 
preference that is not solely focused on financial targets (Astrachan & Jaskiewicz, 
2008) and short-term profit maximization (Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1990; Morck 
& Yeung, 2003). This makes family firms more apt to explore future business 
opportunities (Ward, 1987) and enables them to be explorative.  
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However, family firms are also often seen as very cost efficient (Anderson & Reeb, 
2003; Carney, 2005), as the profitability of family firms is directly connected to the 
wealth of the owning family (Anderson & Reeb, 2003). With a long-term orientation 
to ensure company survival over several family generations, family firms also 
develop a reputation for high quality (Davis, 1983; Kets de Vries, 1993; Ward, 
1988). Additionally, family firms have a tendency to apply centralized 
organizational structures (Bartholomeusz & Tanewski, 2006) and decision making 
(Lindow, Stubner, & Wulf, 2010), which indicates the unwillingness to give up 
personal power and control owing to the dual roles held by family members 
(Carney, 2005). This focus on optimization and quality together with the 
centralized management approach then results in efficient exploitation of existing 
business activities (Tagiuri & Davis, 1996). Taken together, the impact of family 
influence on exploration and exploitation in the family firm should then result in a 
high level of organizational ambidexterity. This is reflected in hypothesis 1a: 
 
Hypothesis 1a: A high level of family influence on a firm’s culture leads to a 
higher level of organizational ambidexterity in the firm.  
 
The power dimension of family influence measures the extent to which a family 
influences a firm through direct ownership, active governance, and involvement in 
management functions (Astrachan et al., 2002). Family influence is thus a 
measure of how easily a family is able to influence firm behavior to impose family 
goals on the family firm. 
 
The aim to realize OA will lead to a constant state of competition for scarce 
resources that need to be allocated between exploitative and explorative activities 
(Simsek, 2009). Especially in family firms that often are organized as one unit 
(Whiteside & Brown, 1991), ongoing alignment of operative and strategic activities 
in an organizational and cultural context within one unit is needed (Bartlett & 
Ghoshal, 1990, 1994; Burgelman, 1991). A high level of power then facilitates 
decision-making. It enables organizations to impose decisions between explorative 
and exploitative objectives and toward goals that are family-related. The family 
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firm tendency toward more centralized structures and decision-making (for 
example Bartholomeusz & Tanewski, 2006) further facilitates a direct impact on 
the firm’s operations. This creates an environment where resources are swiftly and 
efficiently allocated by the family exerting its controlling power when making 
investment decisions. This influence of family power is reflected in hypothesis 1b: 
 
Hypothesis 1b: A high level of family power in a firm leads to a higher level 
of organizational ambidexterity.  
 
The experience dimension of family influence measures how much experience a 
family has in managing and governing the firm, for example, through long-term 
ownership. Attaining an ambidextrous organization requires long-term experience 
in building an organization that unites contradictory activities within a company 
(Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004). Family firms are often characterized by being multi-
generational (Zellweger & Nason, 2008) and having a desire to achieve 
stakeholder wealth to preserve the family heritage for future generations (Le 
Breton-Miller & Miller, 2006) Higher levels of family experience should thus 
indicate more experience in building an ambidextrous organization. This reasoning 
is reflected in hypothesis 1c: 
 
Hypothesis 1c: A high level of family experience leads to a higher level of 
organizational ambidexterity.  
 
Research on organizational ambidexterity has shown that an increased level of OA 
leads to a higher and more sustainable financial performance (He, 2004; Lubatkin, 
Simsek, Ling, & Veiga, 2006; Simsek, Heavey, Veiga, & Souder, 2009), as the 
company shows efficiency in managing current business demands, while at the 
same time possessing the flexibility necessary to adapt to new challenges and 
opportunities in the environment (Benner & Tushman, 2003; Birkinshaw & Gibson, 
2004; Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004). 
 
Organiza
Although 
substanti
companie
2004), w
thinking a
to a bette
2:  
 
Hy
po
 
The full re
 
Figure 40:
 
3. Met
 
3.1. Res
To test 
(Backhau
managers
al., 200
recomme
Ellenriede
response
tional Ambid
the costs
al (Gibson
s remain 
e believe 
nd its imp
r econom
pothesis 2
sitively inf
search m
 Research M
hodology
earch Des
our hypo
s, Erichso
 of family
4). We 
ndations 
r, 2009) a
 biases (D
exterity and
 associate
 & Birkinsh
unsucces
that the s
lementatio
ic perform
: A high 
luences its
odel is gra
odel 
  
ign and S
theses, w
n, Plinke
 firms to g
developed
from ma
nd took m
ielman, 19
Family Firm
d with ac
aw, 2004
sful in the
pecial con
n. Conse
ance amo
level of or
 economic
phically su
ample G
e develo
, & Weib
ain access
 our q
rket rese
ethodolog
91; Podsa
 Performanc
hieving a
; Yang & A
ir efforts a
text of a 
quently, hi
ng family 
ganization
 performa
mmarized
eneration
ped a la
er, 2010)
 to primar
uestionnai
arch lite
ical precau
koff, Mac
e  
 high leve
tuahene-G
nd fail (O
family firm
gher level
firms, as r
al ambide
nce.  
 in Figure 
rge-scale 
 and add
y data (fo
re using 
rature (B
tions for r
Kenzie, Le
l of ambi
ima, 200
'Reilly III 
 eases a
s of ambid
eflected b
xterity in 
40. 
empirica
ressed it 
r example
methodo
erekoven
educing c
e, & Pods
1
dexterity a
7) and ma
& Tushma
mbidextro
exterity le
y hypothe
a family fi
l instrume
to top-le
Chrisman
logies a
, Ecker, 
oncerns ov
akoff, 200
31 
re 
ny 
n, 
us 
ad 
sis 
rm 
 
nt 
vel 
 et 
nd 
& 
er 
3). 
Organizational Ambidexterity and Family Firm Performance  
132 
Additionally, we conducted a pre-test involving several family firm executives and 
researchers to further optimize our questionnaire.  
 
We used a convenience sample as the address base and sent the questionnaires 
to 2,200 single respondents who were top-level managers in family firms in 
Germany. The mailing was sent out in June 2009 and accompanied by a 
personalized letter explaining the research project (for example Phan & Hill, 1995). 
After a two-wave mailing initiative, 209 companies returned the questionnaire (a 
response rate of 9.5%). This rate is similar to empirical studies previously 
conducted on family firms (for example Rutherford et al., 2008; Schulze, Lubatkin, 
Dino, & Buchholtz, 2001). Before proceeding to the empirical analyses, we verified 
the quality of the created dataset (Burns, 2008; Tabachnik & Fidell, 2007). First, 
we inspected the minimum and maximum values, means, and standard deviations 
from every variable for plausibility. Here, we found no mistakes regarding the 
accuracy of the data entry. Although we did not find any cases of wrong data 
entry, several questionnaires had missing values in different parts of the 
questionnaire. To solve this problem in the most proper way (Draper & Smith, 
1998), we deleted these cases from the dataset, reducing the final sample to 104 
companies.  
 
Due to the cross-sectional survey setup of this study, we checked for potential 
biases, as these could reduce the validity of the results. Here, a known concern in 
empirical research is that the characteristics of respondents of a study may differ 
from those of non-respondents (Armstrong & Overton, 1977; Kanuk & Berenson, 
1975; Oppenheim, 2000). Using the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test (Young, 1977) and 
the non-parametric Mann-Whitney U-test, we tested for differences between early 
and late responses. Our analyses revealed no statistically significant response 
biases within this study. Beside non-response bias, the influence of common 
methods bias has been an important concern in management research (Podsakoff 
et al., 2003). This bias describes variance in results that is attributable to the 
applied measurement method, rather than to the constructs that the measures 
represent (Podsakoff et al., 2003). Harman’s single-factor test is the most widely 
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known approach for assessing common method bias in a single-method research 
design (Malhotra, Kim, & Patil, 2006) (Malhotra, Kim, and Patil 2006). Again, our 
results did not show any indication of being biased. To finally examine the internal 
consistency and reliability of the used constructs, we computed Cronbach’s alpha 
(Cronbach, 1987). For all constructs used in this study, we achieved highly 
satisfactory results. 
 
3.2. Measures 
 
Organizational ambidexterity. As the field of organizational ambidexterity is a 
relatively new domain, there is no commonly accepted measure of OA (Lubatkin et 
al., 2006). While Benner and Tushman (2003) defined and conceptualized OA in 
two dimensions and measured differences in exploration and exploitation in a 
firm’s technological horizon, He and Wong (2004) designed a measure based on 
product design differences, related to exploration and exploitation. Lubatkin 
(2006)combined the measures and developed a way to assess organizational 
ambidexterity by using a 12-item measure, with six items asking for exploratory 
orientation and six items asking for exploitative orientation. Managers assess their 
firms’ behavior over the past years using a five-point Likert scale, ranging from one 
(strongly disagree) to five (strongly agree). To derive the level of OA, the individual 
values along the six dimensions of exploration and exploitation were added. As we 
regard this construct as the most appropriate so far, we selected the construct 
from Lubatkin (2006)for this study.  
 
Family influence. Family influence is the main independent variable in our study, 
which we measured on a continuous and multidimensional scale based on the F-
PEC scale of family influence (Astrachan et al., 2002; Klein et al., 2005). Family 
influence is thus measured with a construct focusing on three dimensions: family 
power, family experience, and family culture. The power dimension measures a 
family’s influence on the company with regard to family ownership, governance, 
and management. We asked respondents about the percentage of family 
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members sharing company ownership and the percentage of family members on 
the management and governance boards.  
 
We measured the experience dimension of the F-PEC scale by asking 
respondents to indicate the generation of the family owning the business, the 
generation that is active on the management board, and the generation of the 
family active on the governance board. As suggested by Klein, Astrachan, and 
Smyrnios (2005), we weighted the experience of the company with respect to the 
generation currently present in the firm. Thus, the first generation was re-coded as 
zero, meaning there exists no benefit of generational experience, the second 
generation was assigned a weight of 0.5, the third generation a weight of 0.75, the 
fourth generation a weight of 0.875 and so forth.  
 
The final dimension, culture, was measured with 13 items reflecting a family’s 
commitment and contribution to the firm, the alignment of family and business 
goals as well as pride and loyalty toward the company. Using the F-PEC scale 
allowed us to measure and compare various levels of family influence among the 
firms in our sample and to include family influence as an independent variable in 
our analysis (Cliff & Jennings, 2005).  
 
Firm performance. We measured the financial performance of the participating 
firms based on the respondents’ subjective evaluations, for several reasons. On 
the one hand, gathering and accurately interpreting a family firm’s financial 
performance is challenging. The profits may be distorted by industry-specific 
factors and there is barely any reliable access to performance data for privately 
held firms (Dess & Robinson Jr, 1984). In addition, financial measures often fail to 
adequately reflect the extent to which short- and long-term objectives have been 
achieved (Geringer & Herbert, 1991) (Geringer and Herbert 1991). Overall, 
strategic management researchers have increasingly employed perceived 
performance measures and proved them to be valid complements for objective 
performance measures (Ramanujam & Venkatraman, 1987). To measure 
perceived performance, we asked the respondents to rate the financial 
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performance of their firms against that of their main competitors (Slater & Narver, 
1993), against their objectives (actual performance vs. planned projections), and 
against the industry average (Geringer & Herbert, 1991). Finally, to synthesize the 
items to one reliable measure, we combined all three indexes into one final index 
“Firm Performance,” ranging from one (significantly worse) to five (significantly 
better). 
 
Control variables. In addition to these main constructs, we added firm size as a 
control since several studies indicated an influence of size on financial 
performance (Daily & Dollinger, 1992). We used the number of employees to 
measure firm size.  
 
4. Analysis and Results 
Table 1 indicates the descriptive statistics for all variables of this study, including 
the minimum and maximum, mean values, and standard deviations. On average, 
the participating family firms possess a degree of organizational ambidexterity of 
7.028 (SD=1.048) and a degree of family influence comprising F-Power of 76.26 
(SD=20.14), F-Experience of 52.27 (SD=33.32), and F-Culture of 91.99 
(SD=0.69).  
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To test our hypotheses, we conducted ordinary least squares (OLS) regression 
analyses.  Table 2 presents the results of these regression analyses for the 
dependent variable “organizational ambidexterity” (Hypotheses 1a–1c). For this, 
we estimated two models. Model 1 includes only the control variables. In model 2, 
we added the main effects of family influence, specifically the variables family 
power, family experience, and family culture. The models explain between 1.5% 
and 7% of the variance in OA, but only the second model is significant (p<.05). 
Additional tests show that the requirements of homoscedasticity and normal 
distribution are met for all models and that no collinearity can be observed.  
 
 
Table 2:  Regression Analysis using Organizational Ambidexterity as Dependent and Family 
Power, Experience, and Culture as Independent Variables 
 
Model 2 shows that two of the three hypotheses regarding the impact of family 
influence on OA, namely hypotheses 1a and 1b, are supported. Hypothesis 1a 
proposes a positive relationship between family power and OA. This hypothesis is 
supported by a positive and significant coefficient for the variable “family power” 
(ß=.215, p<.05). In support of hypothesis 1b, we find a positive and significant 
relationship between “family culture” and OA (ß=.198, p<.05). Hypothesis 1c, 
however, which proposed a positive impact of family experience on OA, is not 
Model 1 Model 2 
OA OA
Size .120 .151
Family Power - .215 *
Family Experience - .010
Family Culture - .198 *
R² .015 .11
Change in R² .091
Adj. r² .005 .070
Level of significance .216 .024
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; t p < .10
OA, Organizational Ambidexterity
Standardized Coefficients (ß)
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supported. In addition, the control variable “firm size” does not have a positive 
impact on OA.  
 
To test hypothesis 2, we estimated another set of two regression models. 
Hypothesis 2 proposes a positive relationship between OA and firm performance. 
Table 3 shows the results of OLS regression analyses for the dependent variable 
“firm performance.” Model 1 includes only the control variable. In model 2, we 
added the main effect of organizational ambidexterity. The two models explain up 
to 4.8% of the variance in firm performance, but only model 2 shows a tendency 
toward significance (p=.081). Additional tests show that the requirements of 
homoscedasticity and normal distribution were met for all three models and that no 
collinearity was observed.  
 
 
Table 3:  Regression Analysis using Firm Performance as Dependent and Organizational 
Ambidexterity as Independent Variable 
 
As the significant coefficient of the variable OA in model 2 (ß=.221, p<.05) 
indicates, our results support hypothesis 2, which proposes a positive impact of 
OA on firm performance. The influence of the control variable “firm size,” however, 
was again insignificant (ß=.017).  
 
In summary, our regression analyses show that increasing levels of family 
influence lead to higher levels of OA for two of the three family influence 
Model 1 Model 2
Performance Performance
Size .017 -.010
Organizational Ambidexterity - .221 *
R² .000 .048
Change in R² - .048
Adj. r² -.010 .030
Level of significance .865 .081
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; t p < .10
Standardized Coefficients (ß)
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dimensions of the F-PEC. In addition, we find an indication that an increase in the 
level of OA also positively influences firm performance. Thus, three of our four 
hypotheses are supported. 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
In our paper, we developed and tested hypotheses regarding the relation between 
family influence and organizational ambidexterity in family firms as well as 
between OA and firm performance. Our results indicate that an increase in family 
influence, especially on a firm’s culture and family power, leads to a higher level of 
OA in an organization. Subsequently, we analyzed and tested the relationship 
between OA in an organization and economic performance for the same set of 
family firms. Here, our results show that a higher level of ambidexterity in family 
firms indeed leads to a better economic performance.  
 
Discussing our results in more detail, we first analyzed the role of family influence 
on the level of ambidexterity within an organization. In line with our expectations, 
our analyses confirmed the positive effects of family influence on OA. This holds 
particularly true for the level of family firm culture positively influencing the level of 
OA. Furthermore, the level of family power (measured through a family’s share of 
ownership as well as the percentage of family members within the management 
and governance board) positively influences a firm’s ambidextrous orientation. 
Against our expectations, we found no significant results for the impact of the level 
of family experience on a company’s level of organizational ambidexterity.  
 
Our findings are in line with some other studies examining family influence 
(Denison, Lief, & Ward, 2004; Dyer, 1988; Miller & Breton-Miller, 2005). Recent 
studies, for example, frequently mention the importance a family’s culture has in 
shaping a positive atmosphere within a company (Denison et al., 2004; Miller & 
Breton-Miller, 2005; Miller et al., 2007) and the resulting performance advantages. 
While we do not analyze how family influence in culture leads to higher OA, we 
believe that our studies provide additional support for these findings. We also 
analyzed and tested the relationship between ambidexterity in a family firm and 
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economic performance. Our results indicate that a higher level of OA leads to a 
better economic performance among family firms. This is in line with findings from 
strategy research in general (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; Hill & Birkinshaw, 2006) 
and supports the growing call for more transfer between research streams as 
strategy and family firm research.  
 
Some limitations that potentially could reduce the general transferability of our 
results need to be addressed. We used a cross-sectional design collecting all 
sample information in 2009. In some of the analyzed relationships, it might thus 
not be possible to infer causality as we do not look at longitudinal data. 
Nevertheless, previous studies found that particular variables relating to family 
influence and culture are relatively stable over time (Craig & Moores, 2005). In 
addition, our selection sample and data are not perfectly random with all included 
family businesses located in Germany, and we used a convenience sample. 
However, this is in line with previous research on family firms (Kellermanns & 
Eddleston, 2006), and we do not expect this to be of major concern. We gathered 
our data mainly by relying on primary self-assessment information. Although this 
might lead to biased information deviating from objective data, this approach is 
common practice in family business research (Lyon, Lumpkin, & Dess, 2000). 
Furthermore, we validated several samples with secondary information from public 
sources to ensure a high level of data quality.  
 
Our final sample size of 104 might also raise concerns relating to statistical power, 
which we tried to mitigate by using appropriate tests confirming data validity. 
Another limitation of our findings relates to the sample focus on respondents 
stemming from a strong focus on top executives working in family firms. However, 
previous studies found that especially top management members are considered a 
reliable source of information (Chaganti, Chaganti, & Vijay, 1989) (Glick, Huber, 
Miller, Doty, & Sutcliffe, 1990), and thus, we believe that this approach is suitable 
for our chosen research setup. Finally, most of our results can merely be seen as 
indications as they explain only up to 7% in the variance of the dependent 
variables. Nevertheless, these findings are stable and contribute to our 
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understanding of family firm performance. Based on our analyses, we identify 
several directions for future research. First, we used elements of the F-PEC scale 
to measure family influence. Although this measure is an accepted construct in 
family firm research, other measures might be able to better explain the impact 
that a family has on developing OA in a family firm. Thus, more research in this 
field would be necessary using other constructs for family influence, or even 
comparing several constructs in one study. Furthermore, family influence 
measures do not reflect how family firms actually achieve OA. We believe that 
family influence has an impact on the behavior of the family firm and that a better 
understanding of this behavior would enable us to derive more concrete 
statements about the how and when of creating OA in the organization. In line with 
this research direction, future studies could also look at the type of OA realized in 
family firms (see Simsek et al. 2009 for an overview of the different identified types 
of OA in a firm). Finally, to draw conclusions on the heterogeneity of family firms 
across countries, more research using a cross-country setup is needed.  
 
In summary, our paper contributes to the understanding of family firms by 
introducing organizational ambidexterity into the discussion about family firm 
performance and family firm heterogeneity. Our results show that family power and 
culture have a positive influence on the ambidextrous orientation in family firms 
and that higher levels of OA lead to a better economic performance. Thus, our 
findings add to the development of explanatory factors of family firm performance 
(Melin & Nordqvist, 2007; Sharma, 2004; Westhead & Howorth, 2006). Our results 
also support the call of several scholars for organizations in general to aim to 
become more ambidextrous (He, 2004; Lubatkin et al., 2006; Simsek, 2009; 
Tushman & O'Reilly III, 1996). For managerial practice, our findings highlight the 
special role of family firms as well as the positive performance impact achieved by 
having an organization with a strong orientation toward ambidexterity.  
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V. THE IMPACT OF SUCCESOR GENERATION DISCOUNT IN FAMILY 
FIRMS: EXAMINING NONLINEAR EFFECTS ON EXPLORATION AND 
EXPLOITATION 
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Christian Brands and Torsten Wulf 
 
Abstract 
This paper contributes to the debate on generational involvement in family firms 
and its impact on new capability exploration and resource exploitation.  Using the 
resource-based view we argue that first, a U-shaped relationship between 
generational involvement in family firms and the level of exploration and second, 
an inverse U-shaped relationship between generational involvement and the level 
of exploitation exists.  We posit that as the generation managing family firms 
increases, new capability exploration decreases.  Simultaneously existing 
resource exploitation rises up to a point where efficiency improvements no longer 
lead to performance advantages.  An empirical investigation involving 125 family 
firms confirms our hypotheses.  
 
Keywords 
Exploration, exploitation, generational involvement, resource-based view, 
empirical investigation 
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1. Introduction 
Family firm researchers regard the level to which family firms concentrate on 
exploitative and explorative behavior as an important driver of differences in family 
firm performance (Sharma & Salvato, 2011).  Exploitation refers to the orientation 
of a firm towards efficiency in managing today’s business demands through 
exploiting existing resources, while exploration describes a firm’s ability to be 
adaptive to changes in the environment through discovering new opportunities 
(Duncan, 1976; Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; March, 1991; Tushman & O'Reilly III, 
1996).  Long-lived family firms have been found to be capable of simultaneously 
exploring new possibilities while exploiting old certainties (Bergfeld & Weber, 
2011; March, 1991).  At the same time family firm research has also shown, that 
family influence positively affects a family firm’s level of both exploration and 
exploitation resulting in higher performance levels (Patel & Fiet, 2011; Stubner, 
Blarr, Brands, & Wulf, 2012).  
 
However, research suggests that the performance of family firms does not remain 
constant over the life-cycle stages of the firm (Eddleston, Kellermanns, Floyd, 
Crittenden, & Crittenden, 2013).  Several studies in family firm research thus 
distinguish between founding generation and successor generation-led family 
firms (Stewart & Hitt, 2011) when trying to explain performance differences of life-
cycle stages.  These studies have discovered lower performance effects for 
succeeding generations than for founders (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Andres, 2008; 
Villalonga & Amit, 2006).  This successor generation discount has been attributed 
to successive generations being more risk averse than founding generations 
(Gómez-Mejía, Haynes, Núñez-Nickel, Jacobson, & Moyano-Fuentes, 2007; Short 
Jeremy, Payne, Brigham Keith, Lumpkin, & Broberg, 2009; van Essen, Carney, 
Gedajlovic, & Heugens, 2011) since passing control to later generations may 
weaken the entrepreneurial spirit and increase the willingness to divest resources 
(Kellermanns, 2005).  Since a weakened entrepreneurial spirit results in less 
explorative behavior one can infer that as the family firm matures, the association 
between exploration and family firm performance becomes less evident (Gómez-
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Mejía et al., 2007; Jones Carla, Makri, & Gomez-Mejia Luis, 2008; Stubner et al., 
2012).  At the same time, exploitative activities become more relevant as family 
firms mature with exploitative activities taking over as a performance driver 
(Sharma & Salvato, 2011).  Transferring these results to the level of exploration 
and exploitation in family firms leads to the assumption that both vary as higher 
family generations are involved in a family firm’s management (Ling & 
Kellermanns, 2010). 
 
Based on the RBV this paper examines the effects of different management 
generations in family firms on the level of their explorative and exploitative 
behavior.  Despite existing family firm literature showing a family firm’s capability 
of simultaneously exploring new possibilities through entrepreneurial risk-taking 
based on unique capabilities while exploiting the valuable and rare nature of a 
firm’s existing resources (Bergfeld & Weber, 2011; March, 1991), the specific 
generational context unique to family firms (Chirico, Ireland, & Sirmon, 2011; 
Eddleston et al., 2013) indicates that explorative and exploitative tendencies tend 
to vary over the life-cycle stages of family firms.  According to the resource-based 
view (RBV) (Barney, 1991; Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984), firms use two 
distinct mechanisms of rent creation for building valuable, rare, inimitable and 
organizational resources (Barney, 2007): Schumpeterian rent creation 
mechanisms based on explorative capabilities and Ricardian rent creation 
mechanisms based on the exploitation of resources (Lim, Celly, Morse, & Rowe, 
2013; Makadok, 2001).  Research on the resource based view has shown that 
firms tend to concentrate on one type of rent generation mechanism at a time (Lim 
et al., 2013).  
 
Based on existing family firm literature examining exploration and exploitation 
(Patel & Fiet, 2011; Sharma & Salvato, 2011), the unique generational context 
present in family firms (Dawson, Sharma, Irving, Marcus, & Chirico, 2013; 
Eddleston et al., 2013) and drawing on the RBV (Barney, 1991; Lim et al., 2013; 
Makadok, 2001), we argue that the level of exploration and exploitation varies 
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depending on the generation managing the family firm.  We suggest that due to 
their specific characteristics family firms are likely to apply Schumpeterian rent 
generation mechanisms while early generation managers lead the firm.  Thus, 
they put an emphasis on explorative behavior at this stage.  However, as 
generational involvement in a family firm’s management increases the 
concentration on existing capabilities increases (Kellermanns, 2005) meaning 
efforts to create Schumpeterian rents based on explorative capabilities tend to 
diminish.  At the same time, increasing generational involvement in family firms 
leads to an increase in conflict potential among different family members leading 
to efforts to protect the wealth of the family (Lubatkin, Schulze, Ling, & Dino, 
2005), to an increased pressure on short-term performance (Casillas, Moreno, & 
Barbero, 2010) and thus to an exploitation of existing resources.  Efforts to create 
Ricardian rents based on exploitation of resources consequently increase to a 
point where the firm has fully exploited existing resources (Patel & Fiet, 2011).  
Then, the family firm is forced to concentrate on explorative behavior again and – 
often – to enter into a phase of managing growth more like a nonfamily firm 
(Gersick, Davis, McCollom Hampton, & Lansberg, 1997).  We thus hypothesize a 
U-shaped relationship between generational involvement in a family firms’ 
management and the level of exploration and an inverse U-shaped relationship 
between the generational involvement in a family firms’ management and the level 
of exploitation.  An empirical analysis involving 125 private German family firms 
supports our theoretical argumentation.  
 
As such, our paper makes three contributions to the family firm literature.  
Theoretically, we add to the ongoing debate regarding family firm heterogeneity by 
including generational involvement in a family firms’ management as a variable 
explaining observed differences in family firm behavior.  Additionally, this paper 
contributes to the debate on the effect of generational involvement on exploration 
and exploitation.  Moreover, we carefully add knowledge to the resource based-
view theory by proposing a non-linear relationship between the life-cycle stages a 
family firm goes through measured by the generation managing the firm and both 
Schumpeterian and Ricardian rent creation thus extending previous findings.  
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From a practical perspective our paper offers insights for family firm managers as 
to the importance of focusing on both Ricardian and Schumpeterian rent creation 
mechanisms during different generational stages of the firm’s development.  
 
This paper proceeds as follows: First we lay the theoretical foundation by 
reviewing the RBV and its relationship with resource exploration and exploitation.  
Second we review the importance of resource exploration and exploitation for 
family firms.  Third, we introduce generational involvement in family firms as a 
variable explaining observed differences in both strategic orientations over 
different life-cycle stages.  We conclude by discussing the contributions, limitations 
and both theoretical and practical implications of this paper.  
 
2. The RBV and the importance of exploration and exploitation 
According to the resource-based view, which defines a firm as a bundle of tangible 
and intangible resources (Barney, 1991) where organizational success and a 
sustainable competitive advantage depend on the extent that these resources are 
valuable, rare, inimitable and organized (Barney, 2007), firms focus on two core 
rent creation mechanisms to obtain a sustained competitive advantage: 
Schumpeterian rent creation based on explorative capabilities and Ricardian rent 
creation based on the exploitation of resources (Lim et al., 2013).  Schumpeterian 
rents enable innovative processes and support firms in adapting to changing 
market environments in the long-run (Teece & Pisano, 1994).  These 
Schumpeterian rents are predominantly created through explorative activities 
based on unique capabilities (Mahoney & Pandian, 1992).  The RBV sees 
capabilities as firm specific with a relative emphasis on explorative activities 
strengthening a firm’s inimitable and organized dimensions of the RBV.  
Consequently, firms that emphasize explorative activities predominantly create 
value on the basis of new product development capabilities and innovation through 
Schumpeterian rents (Lim et al., 2013).   
 
In the context of this paper we define exploration of capabilities leading to 
Schumpeterian rents according to March’s seminal paper as the creation of 
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distinctly different competencies through variation, risk taking, experimentation, 
discovery and innovation (March, 1991) with the aim of developing new 
technologies, products or markets building the base for a firm’s growth and cash 
flow in the long run (Tushman & O'Reilly III, 1996).  Exploration thus focusses on 
developing a new product or market capabilities (Voss & Voss, 2012) where 
product exploration essentially leads to a completely new product while market 
exploration targets new customers outside currently served markets.  Following 
this line of argumentation, explorative capabilities support firms in creating 
Schumpeterian rents (Lim et al., 2013) leading to a sustained competitive 
advantage.  
 
In contrast to Schumpeterian rents, Ricardian rents are obtained by possessing 
and using resources being a firm’s financial, physical, individual, and 
organizational capital attributes (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993) for less than their 
marginal productivity when utilized in combination with other resources (Makadok, 
2001).  The key thus is resource picking where a firm has to come into possession 
of resources being able to generate economic rents by outsmarting the resource 
market through superior resource-picking skills (Makadok, 2001).  Once these 
resources are possessed by a firm the Ricardian perspective argues that through 
exploiting the valuable and rare nature of the obtained resources firms ultimately 
create economic rents (Lim et al., 2013).  Exploitation mechanisms applied by 
firms with a Ricardian focus include property rights, resource position barriers 
(Wernerfelt, 1984), immobility of valuable and rare resources (Barney, 1991) and 
imperfect factor markets (Barney, 1986).  The creation of economic rents thus 
takes place through the selection of the right resources prior to their acquisition 
and their subsequent exploitation (Makadok, 2001).  
 
For the purpose of this paper we define exploitation as activities capturing 
efficiency, production, selection and execution referring to incremental innovations 
of existing products, operations and competencies to meet the needs of existing 
customers to generate profits for the short run (March, 1991; Tushman & O'Reilly 
III, 1996).  Exploitation activities thus refine and incrementally extend existing 
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products and markets to better meet existing and enhance satisfaction for current 
customers (Voss & Voss, 2012).  The level of exploitation in firm is predominantly 
driven through its focus on Ricardian rent creation.   
 
3. The importance of exploration and exploitation in family firms 
Research on family firms has acknowledged that a systematic exploration of 
opportunities is vital to a family firm’s long-term survival across generations since 
a family firm’s success often depends on its ability to enter new geographic and 
product markets (Kellermanns & Eddleston, 2006; Ward, 1987).  Consequently, a 
family firm’s profitability and growth can be enhanced through explorative activities 
looking for new ways to make a family firm’s products more distinct (Chrisman, 
Chua, & Zahra, 2003).  Moreover, explorative activities and investments generate 
high growth (March, 1991) ensuring performance advantages and long-term 
survival.  Allocating the right strategic resources such as a family firm’s culture to 
explorative activities is particularly important to family firms since they do not have 
the slack resources required many non-family firms possess that enable them to 
have explorative failures (Zahra, Hayton, & Salvato, 2004).  
 
Through their long-term nature family firms tend to have the right culture to pursue 
explorative activities creating Schumpeterian rents, which allow them to dedicate 
resources required for risk-taking and explorative activities (Zahra et al., 2004).  
Family firms are characterized through both family and non-family members 
having an exceptionally strong loyalty to the firm ensuring the family firm’s long-
term survival is secured through explorative activities (Burkart, Panunzi, & Shleifer, 
2003).  This strong loyalty is enhanced through a family firm’s relative employment 
security facilitating explorative activities without the fear of being punished when 
failures occur (Webb, Ketchen, & Ireland, 2010).  Moreover, family firms tend to 
adopt an informal approach to justice meaning a lack of conflict enables 
explorative activities through experimentation (Ensley & Pearson, 2005; Lubatkin, 
Simsek, Ling, & Veiga, 2006).  One could thus assume that a pure focus on 
exploration ensures a family firm’s long-term performance and ultimately survival. 
Nevertheless, while exploration is important to generate long term competencies 
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(Levinthal & March, 1993) a sole focus on exploration does not automatically lead 
to long term success since the constant renewal of products and markets can lead 
to a failure trap where a firm enters a cycle of search and is not rewarded for its 
change efforts (Volberda & Lewin, 2003).  An overdependence on exploration can 
lead to a situation where firms abandon existing routines too quickly and thus do 
not fully benefit from scale economies (Chesbrough & Rosenbloom, 2002; March, 
1991).  Family firms should thus not overemphasize explorative activities, but also 
have to pursue exploitative activities.  
 
Exploiting advantages of discovered opportunities through the accumulated stocks 
of tacit knowledge ensures short term performance advantages for family firms 
(Sharma & Salvato, 2011).  Family firms require these constant returns from 
existing resources not only to operate their daily business, but also to finance 
future explorative activities (Levinthal & March, 1993).  Returns from exploitative 
activities tend to be more certain than returns from exploration (March, 1991) 
which is why exploitative activities are also important to family firms. In a given set 
of markets and products opportunity exploitation is vital for family firms to achieve 
maximum returns (Sharma & Salvato, 2011).  Family firms usually enjoy inimitable 
knowledge and experience advantages in areas close to existing operations (Patel 
& Fiet, 2011) meaning exploitation can help to advance opportunities in areas 
closely related to a family firm’s existing operations. 
 
Through their centralized decision-making structures (Pondy, 1969) and the 
family’s strong influence on the delegation of power (Habbershon & Williams, 
1999) family firms have the right structures to pursue exploitative activities creating 
Ricardian rents.  Once family firms have established family wealth or a family 
legacy they tend to become more conservative (Morris, Williams, Allen, & Avila, 
1997) focusing on exploitative activities.  In particular, family firms that fear losing 
their inheritance tend to over emphasize short-term oriented, exploitative value 
creating activities (Zahra et al., 2004).  Moreover, exploitation can be effective to 
smaller and family firms if pursued as an internally consistent strategy compared 
to a mixed strategy creating doubts as to which strategic initiatives an organization 
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is representative of (Ebben & Johnson, 2005).  Family firms also have a tendency 
to sustain short-term competitiveness through simplifying routines increasing 
efficiency and thus exploitative activities (Levinthal & March, 1993; Webb et al., 
2010).  This tendency is further enhanced through tight family-control resulting in a 
homogeneous decision-making group managing the firm. Family-controlled, 
homogeneous decision-making groups thus tend to be adequately suited to 
pursue exploitative activities producing Ricardian rents (Webb et al., 2010).  
 
It has generally been accepted that successful firms with a sustained competitive 
advantage use a combination of resource exploration leading to Schumpeterian 
rents and resource exploitation leading to Ricardian rents (Lubatkin et al., 2006; 
March, 1991).  However, despite the merits of pursuing both exploration and 
exploitation simultaneously to create a sustained competitive advantage, research 
has acknowledged that mechanisms creating Ricardian and Schumpeterian rents 
vary over time (Lim et al., 2013).  Regardless of most firms using a combination of 
both rent creation mechanism (Makadok, 2001) one of the two is usually more 
dominant in certain periods of time (Lim et al., 2013).  Teece et al. (1994) argue 
that capabilities creating both Schumpeterian and Ricardian rents are built over 
time with one dominating over the other and vice versa depending on the age of 
the firm.  In the early stages of a firm, where no competitive advantage yet exists, 
firms tend to focus on Schumpeterian rent creation through resource exploration.  
As the firm ages and Schumpeterian rents mature, firms tend to switch to 
exploiting the resources previously established through exploration thus creating 
Ricardian rents (Makadok, 2001).  Research thus points towards a nonlinear 
development of both mechanisms over the life-cycle stages of a firm.  
 
Given the importance of both exploration and exploitation in family firms and their 
unique generational context (Dawson et al., 2013; Eddleston et al., 2013), where 
clear knowledge differences and varying preferences for the strategic rent creation 
orientation can be attached to generation managing a family firm (Sciascia, 
Mazzola, & Chirico, 2013), one can assume a nonlinear development of both 
exploration and exploitation exists over different generational stages of the family 
The Impact of Succesor Generation Discount in Family Firms: Examining Nonlinear Effects on 
Exploration and Exploitation  
159 
firm.  Transferring this argumentation to the context of our paper means the focus 
on either Ricardian rent creation through exploitation or Schumpeterian rent 
creation through exploration depends on the life-cycle stage of the family firm.  We 
address this controversial topic by focusing on an important source of life-cycle 
stage differences in family firms: generational involvement of family members in a 
family firm’s management.  Extending the commentary by Sharma and Salvato 
(2011) we argue that family generational involvement in management explains 
differences in Ricardian and Schumpeterian rent creation mechanisms and thus 
exploitation and exploration activities over the life-cycle stages of family firms.  As 
such a nonlinear approach to the influence of generational involvement on 
exploration and exploitation in family firms is adopted.  
 
4. The impact of generational involvement on exploration and exploitation 
in family firms 
Research on family firms has acknowledged that different generations managing a 
family firm have different aspirations regarding a family firm’s focus on growth or 
wealth preservation (Carlock & Janssens, 2007).  First-generation or founder-led 
family firms typically build up a great amount of capabilities and rituals focusing on 
growth creating a critical size rather than wealth preservation since no resources 
and thus competitive advantage yet exists (Astrachan, Klein, & Smyrnios, 2002; 
Bammens, Voordeckers, & Van Gils, 2008; Klein, Astrachan, & Smyrnios, 2005).  
According to the RBV, capabilities are created through explorative activities such 
as risk taking, experimentation or discovery and innovation producing pay-offs in 
the form of Schumpeterian rents.  The family’s original fortune is thus usually 
created by a single founder (Jaffe & Lane, 2004) through explorative activities.  It 
is the founder of the family firm who through his entrepreneurial mindset focused 
on identifying new opportunities through exploration lays the foundation of the 
family business (Kellermanns & Eddleston, 2006; Sirmon & Hitt, 2003).  
Consequently, the level of exploration in a family firm is expected to be high during 
the first generation.  
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However, it is often suggested that over time founders become more risk-averse 
or conservative resulting in an unwillingness to continue to invest in explorative 
activities (Kellermanns & Eddleston, 2006; Zahra et al., 2004).  Family-firm 
founders over time sense the high risk of failure of their explorative activities 
endangering past success and their desire to build a lasting legacy for future 
generations (Morris et al., 1997).  Moreover, this risk-averse behavior of family firm 
founders is further enhanced through findings that second and subsequent 
generations tend to contribute far less to a family firms’ knowledge-development 
process compared to the first generation (Astrachan et al., 2002; Klein et al., 
2005).  As the number of generations actively managing a family firm increases, 
so does the level of task conflict among the family members involved in managing 
the firm (Bammens et al., 2008).  Different generations tend to have different 
opinions as to whether a family firm should pursue a strategy focused on 
exploration or exploitation.  With an increasing number of generations managing a 
family firm the number of active and passive family shareholders increases as well 
(Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2003; Vilaseca, 2002) with the active shareholders 
emphasizing long-term performance objectives and the passive shareholders 
favoring short-term payouts.  Transferring this argument to our paper we can thus 
infer that active, first generation shareholders favor explorative activities creating 
long-term Schumpeterian rents over exploitative activities creating short-term 
Ricardian rents favored by successive generations.  There is thus a tendency for 
the level of explorative activities to decrease as new generations enter a family 
firm’s management.  
 
This line of argumentation is further strengthened if one examines the partnership 
set-ups in family firms as they pass through generations.  As family firms are 
transferred from the first to the second or third-and-beyond-generation family 
members move away from parental firms to sibling or cousin partnerships (Steier, 
2001).  These relationships are characterized by a lower level of intentional trust 
compared to founder-led family firms with later generation relatives attaching a 
greater importance to the prosperity their direct family nucleus rather than their 
extended-family (Schulze et al., 2003).  Second or third-and-beyond-generation 
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family firms will thus shy away from investing in explorative activities favoring 
short-term exploitative initiatives that produce instant returns for their direct family 
nucleus rather than the extend family.  Consequently, as the family firm matures 
and is transferred from the founder to the second generation, the level of 
exploration should decrease.  
 
Needless to say that a decreased focus on exploration in the second generation 
leads to a decrease in long-term growth since the family firm loses its ability to 
enter new markets, revitalize existing operations and thus generate new growth 
(Ward, 1987).  At this stage, many family firm managers realize that assets that 
previously ensured high and steady growth have reached or even overcome their 
full potential.  In order to continue the founder’s legacy many family firms will 
require double-digit compounded annual growth rates (Jaffe & Lane, 2004) which 
can only be achieved by reinventing the company (Kellermanns & Eddleston, 
2006).  However, due to the previously mentioned low levels of intentional trust 
among sibling partnerships managing second-generation family firms, agreeing on 
a common direction for change is difficult (Gersick et al., 1997).  The willingness 
for change towards rejuvenating the family business through exploration is thus 
there, but lacks a unified direction (Eddleston et al., 2013; Zahra et al., 2004).  
 
At this stage the family often looks for outside help in the form of family enterprise 
advisors or professional managers (Davis, Dibrell, Craig, & Green, 2013; Stewart 
& Hitt, 2011).  One way for family firms to thus ensure its company continues to 
grow is to introduce professional managers having the appropriate formal training 
to coordinate different family members’ demands to overcome the dilemma of not 
agreeing on a common future strategy for the family business.  This introduction of 
professional managers in second-generation family firms at least partially infers a 
delegation of managerial authority (Stewart & Hitt, 2011), which usually results in a 
hand-over of control to the third-and-beyond-generation to enable a fresh start.  
These third-and-beyond-generation family firms can be described as cousin-
consortiums where a family still owns a company but an increasing number of 
managers is recruited externally (Eddleston et al., 2013).  However, Chrisman, 
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Chua and Steier (2011) argue that such as transition to professional management 
is only successful if the behavior of the family is also changed.  In practice, this 
means that the family continues to own and manage the company, but leaves the 
management of incremental and progressive innovations, i.e. exploitation to 
professional managers whereas family managers take responsibility to identify 
more radical innovations, i.e. exploration (Sharma & Salvato, 2011).  The level of 
exploration should thus continue to increase once a professional management has 
been introduced leaving enough space for family managers to innovate.  Family 
firms that manage the transition to a professionally managed family firm thus 
enable a new start when Ricardian rents derived from existing products through 
exploitation are in decline and a stronger focus on Schumpeterian rent creating 
and thus exploration is needed.  Consequently:  
 
Hypothesis 1: A U-shaped relationship exists between generational 
involvement in management and the level of exploration in family firms.  
 
As first generation family businesses are often based on innovative ideas 
stemming from explorative activities (Zahra et al., 2004) the level of exploitation in 
the first generational phase of a family business tends to be low.  The family firm 
as it is about to be established has hardly any resources and thus no competitive 
advantage to be exploited yet.  In the early stages family firms are entrepreneurial 
ventures with the founder looking for an opportunity to exploit through explorative 
activities (Eddleston et al., 2013).  Once an opportunity has been identified the 
founder will exploit it through an efficient production, selection and execution to 
create Ricardian rents (Sharma & Salvato, 2011).  From this line of reasoning one 
can thus infer that in the early stages level of exploitation in a family firm is low 
since the strategic focus lies on opportunity exploration.  Once this opportunity has 
been successfully explored the level of exploitation continues as the firm matures.  
 
The focus on exploitative activities further increases as family firms are transferred 
from the first to the second generation. Basco (2013) argues that over generations 
with the acceptance of new family members into a family firm’s management the 
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firm will grow more slowly due to a general fear of losing control to other members 
of the management board.  In addition, with the alteration in the composition of 
management family firms use more conservative strategies (Sciascia & Mazzola, 
2008).  Slower growth and conservative strategies are usually reflected in a focus 
on exploitative rather than explorative activities.  This argument is supported by 
van Essen et al. (2011) who reason that successive generations in family firms are 
more risk averse.  Succeeding generations are believed to preserve rather than 
create wealth as founders of family firms usually try to do (Stewart & Hitt, 2011).  
Increasing generational involvement in family firms leads to an increase in conflict 
potential among different family members leading to efforts to protect the wealth of 
the family (Lubatkin et al., 2005), to an increased pressure on short-term 
performance (Casillas et al., 2010) and thus to an exploitation of existing 
resources. 
 
Moreover, over time a family firm’s long-term development requiring explorative 
activities is often slowed down by quality and quantity of their internal, family 
human capital (Verbeke & Kano, 2010).  The generations succeeding the founder 
of the family firm thus seem to be less qualified to focus on explorative activities 
stipulating a family firm’s growth.  Heirs are usually not as driven to explore new 
opportunities as founders are (Mehrotra, Morck, Shim, & Wiwattanakantang, 2011) 
leading to empirical evidence that founder-controlled firms are superior performers 
and firms controlled by later generation family members are inferior performers in 
comparison with firms run by professional managers (Chrisman, Chua, & Steier, 
2011).  Hence over time a family business that wants to sustain its portfolio of 
activities beyond the second generation has to ensure that it not only exploits 
existing resources to create short term Ricardian rents, but that it reinvests these 
returns to ensure a sustained wealth creation for future generations.  At this stage 
family firms face a crucial decision on whether family members want to inject 
additional capital to grow the family firm through an exploration for radical 
innovations (Jaffe & Lane, 2004).  
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Multigenerational family firms which have at least been passed through two 
successive generations thus tend to push for the exploration of new business 
opportunities while acquiring the preceding generation’s knowledge (Kellermanns 
& Eddleston, 2006).  Since third-and-beyond-generation family firms tend to 
refocus on explorative activities through the creation of Schumpeterian rents we 
assume the level of exploitation to create Ricardian rents decreases.  Formally 
expressed:  
 
Hypothesis 2: An inverted U-shaped relationship exists between 
generational involvement in management and the level of exploitation in 
family firms.  
 
5. Methodology 
We followed recognized data collection measures of earlier studies on family firms 
and used mail-surveys to obtain our data (e.g. Eddleston et al., 2013; Zellweger, 
Kellermanns, Chrisman, & Chua, 2012) from 2,200 family firms in Germany.  The 
mailing list was obtained by randomly drawing from the Hoppenstedt database, the 
most comprehensive SME database in Germany6. We use a SME database as the 
source for our mailing list since family firms dominate among SME’s in Germany 
(see Klein, 2000).  Following a key informant approach (e.g. Zellweger et al., 
2012) we addressed a mailing accompanied by a personal letter to the CEO of the 
private family firm.  The CEO was addressed to ensure a high degree of response 
quality since the head of the family firm is often the main person responsible for 
driving strategic initiatives.  In accordance with prior studies in the family firm 
context we offered our respondents confidentiality to avoid socially desirable 
responding (Davis et al., 2013).  In addition to addressing the questionnaire to the 
family CEO, the firms were asked to self-identify them as family firms.  Having 
completed a two-wave mailing initiative, 209 respondents returned the 
questionnaire, resulting in 10.5% response rate.  This rate is satisfactory for 
private family firms (e.g. Chrisman, Chua, & Litz, 2004; Zellweger et al., 2012).  
Nevertheless, several responses had to be deleted from the dataset due to 
                                                          
6 See www.hoppenstedt.de 
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missing values (Rutherford, Kuratko, & Holt, 2008) reducing the final sample to 
125 private family firms.  The private family firms in the final sample range in size 
from 6 to 6,600 with a mean of 600 and a standard deviation of 756.  
 
Before addressing the empirical results we have to mention our efforts in 
addressing potential biases that could appear as part of our study design.  First, 
we checked for non-response bias (Armstrong & Overton, 1977; Kanuk & 
Berenson, 1975; Oppenheim, 2000) using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (Young, 
1977) and the non-parametric Mann-Whitney U-test to test for differences between 
early and late responses.  No statistically significant response biases were found 
between early and late respondents.  Second, we used Harman’s single factor test 
(Malhotra, Kim, & Patil, 2006) testing for common methods bias in a single-method 
research design (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003).  Our results 
showed no sign of being biased.  Lastly, we also checked the internal reliability 
and consistency of the constructs used computing Cronbach’s alpha (Cronbach, 
1987).  The results achieved were satisfactory.  
 
 
5.1. Constructs 
 
Dependent Variables.  Exploration (α = .73) and exploitation (α = .80) were 
measured using a 12-item construct developed by Lubatkin, Simsek, Ling and 
Veiga (2006), with six items measuring explorative orientation and six items 
measuring exploitative orientation.  The construct was measured on a 5-point 
Likert scale asking family firm CEOs to assess their firm’s behavior over the past 
five years with responses ranging from one (strongly disagree) to five (strongly 
agree).  Lubatkin et al.’s (2006) measure is seen as the most advanced construct 
assessing exploration and exploitation since it combines previous 
conceptualizations of both dimensions (Benner & Tushman, 2003; He, 2004) 
covering all major aspects.  Choosing this construct ensures comparability of our 
findings with the majority of research employing this approach (Voss & Voss, 
2012).  
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Independent Variable.  Generational involvement was measured in accordance 
with other research (e.g. Kellermanns & Eddleston, 2006; Sciascia & Mazzola, 
2008; Zahra et al., 2004) by asking the private family firm CEO to report the 
generation of the owner-family currently managing the family firm and thus being 
part of the family’s top management team (TMT).  Respondents were asked to 
note the highest generation of the owner-family managing the family firm (one, 
two, three etc.) while having the opportunity to indicate that no one from the 
owner-family is active in the family firm’s management.  In our sample, 33% of 
private family firms are managed by the first generation, 30% by the second 
generation and 37% by the third-or-beyond generation.   
 
Controls.  In accordance with prior research, we controlled for eight variables 
(age, size, number of family managers on the TMT, number of non-family 
managers on the TMT, past performance as well as three industries) that could 
influence both exploration and exploitation.  Family firm age was controlled for 
since older firms are expected to undertake explorative initiatives less frequently 
due to inertia (e.g. Hannan & Freeman, 1989) while younger firms are expected to 
grow faster (e.g. Eddleston et al., 2013) thus neglecting exploitative efforts of 
obtained resources.  It was measured by taking the number of years since the 
company was founded (Autio, Sapienza, & Almeida, 2000).  Next we controlled for 
family firm size using the natural log of the number of employees (Zellweger et al., 
2012) as larger firms tend to have more slack resources facilitating structural 
investments in explorative activities (March, 1991).  Given the difficulties 
associated with increasing generational involvement could be related with the 
number of family members on the TMT (Sciascia et al., 2013; Zahra et al., 2004) 
we controlled for number of family members on the TMT.  Since professional 
managers having no relationship with the owner family are considered to be more 
objective when it comes to balancing explorative and exploitative activities 
(Salvato, Chirico, & Sharma, 2010) we controlled for the number of non-family 
members on the TMT.  Additionally, past performance (α = .76) was included as a 
control variable since past firm success has a tendency to encourage explorative 
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activities that without slack resources would not be undertaken (Tasi, 2001).  It 
was measured by asking respondents to rate their private family firm’s financial 
performance relative to their main competitors, industry development and own 
goals for the three-year period 2006-2008 on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 
one (considerably worse) to five (considerably better) (Hart & Banbury, 1994; 
Venkatraman & Ramanujam, 1987).  Finally, as previous research on private 
family firms highlights that industry can affect the level of exploration and 
exploitation we included three industries (Manufacturing 49%, Retail 16% and 
Services 35%) as a control variable (Miller & Cardinal, 1994). 
 
5.2. Results 
 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis was used to test our hypotheses 
with Table 1 presenting the descriptive statistics and correlations for the study’s 
variables.  In Model 1 and 4 we only included the controls variables. In Model 2, 3, 
5 and 6 we tested for both our hypotheses.  We proposed in hypothesis one that a 
U-shaped relationship exists between generational involvement in management 
and the level of exploration in family firms.  In Model 2 exploration was regressed 
on generation with generation squared being added in Model 3.  Despite 
generation not appearing to be significantly related to exploration in Model 2 (-.08; 
not significant), in Model 3 generation exposed a negative and significant 
coefficient (-.45; p < .05) while generation squared was positive and significant 
(.06; p < .01).  The analytical results thus support our first hypothesis.  
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In hypothesis two we proposed an inverted U-shaped relationship exists between 
generational involvement in management and the level of exploitation in family 
firms.  In Model 5 exploitation was regressed on generation.  Generation appears 
to be slightly significantly related to exploitation (.06; p <.10).  In Model 6 
generation squared was added with generation now showing a positive and 
significant coefficient (.24; p < .01) and generation squared a negative and 
significant coefficient (-.16; p < .01).  The analytical results thus also support our 
second hypothesis.  
 
Table 5: Results of Regression on Exploration 
 
Further, to check for the robustness of our nonlinear relationship between 
generational involvement and exploration as well as exploitation in family firms we 
draw on Lind and Mehlum (2010) to assess the validity of a U-shaped relationship 
between generational involvement and exploration and an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between generational involvement and exploitation (see Karim, 2009; 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Exploration Exploration Exploration
Controls
1. Firm Age .01 .01 -.01
2. Firm Sizea .12 *** .15 *** .15 ***
3. Family Managers on TMT .06 .06 .16 *
4. Non-Family Managers on TMT .01 -.01 -.02
5. Performance .07 .05 .06
6. Manufacturing .12 .13 .17
7. Retail -.02 .05 .05
8. Services .06 .11 .30
Main Effects
Generation - -.08 -.45 *
Generation squared - - .06 **
F 3.64 *** 3.51 *** 2.88 **
R² .17 .22 .20
Change in R² .04 .01
Adj. r² .13 .15 .13
n = 125; *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; t p < .10
 TMT, Top Management Team; 
a Variable is a natural logarithm 
Variables
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Wales, Parida, & Patel, 2013).  First we test the joint significance of the direct and 
squared terms of generation on exploration followed by Lind and Mehlum’s (2010) 
test for a U-shaped relationship (H1: The relationship is U-shaped).  The U-shaped 
relationship appears to be significant (p < .01) with an extreme point at the third 
generation (generation: 3.01).  The same procedure was performed to test the 
joint significance of the direct and squared terms of generation on exploitation 
followed by a test for an inverted U-shaped relationship (H1: The relationship is 
inverse U-shaped).  The inverse U-shaped relationship is observed to be 
significant (p < .01) with an extreme point just after the second generation 
(generation: 2.10).  Together, the results of Model 2, 3, 5 and 6 provide consistent 
support for our hypotheses indicating a U-shaped relationship between 
generational involvement in management and exploration in family firms and an 
inverted U-shaped relationship between generational involvement in management 
and exploitation in family firms.  
 
Table 6: Results of Regression on Exploitation 
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Exploitation Exploitation Exploitation
Controls
1. Firm Age -.01 t -.01 .01
2. Firm Sizea .05 * .05 * .08 ***
3. Family Managers on TMT .04 .05 .08 *
4. Non-Family Managers on TMT .01 .02 .02
5. Performance .01 .01 .01
6. Manufacturing .14 t .13 .10
7. Retail .03 -.01 -.75
8. Services .14 .09 .18
Main Effects
Generation - .06 t .24 **
Generation squared - - -.16 **
F 2.48 ** 2.26 ** 1.28 **
R² .13 .18 .19
Change in R² .06 .01
Adj. r² .08 0.12 .12
n = 125; *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; t p < .10
TMT, Top Management Team; 
a Variable is a natural logarithm 
Variables
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success associated with opportunity exploration and exploitation over time, our 
results show that during different generational stages family firms experience 
different levels of both exploration and exploitation.  Specifically, a U-shaped 
relationship between generational involvement in a family firm’s management and 
the level of exploration is confirmed through our empirical results.  The lowest level 
of exploration is attained when the third generation manages the family firm.  At 
this stage family firms are often in the middle of a transition process towards a 
consortium of cousins ownership where an extended family owns a family and 
employs some family members to manage the firm (Eddleston et al., 2013; 
Gersick et al., 1997; Lubatkin et al., 2005).  In these cousin consortiums family 
firms employ an increasing proportion of non-family managers pushing the family 
to become active shareholders rather than active managers.  Altruistic attributes, 
such as the prime goal turning the family enterprise into a dynasty through the 
exploration for radical innovations that were strongly present in the previous 
generations seem to have been lost during the generational transition process 
(Lubatkin et al., 2005).  With this loss and the introduction of professional 
managers a stronger emphasis is placed on short-term performance and dividend 
payments (Schulze et al., 2003) leading to a continuous decrease in exploration.  
 
However, since our empirical findings confirm a U-shaped relationship the level of 
exploration continues to increase again beyond the third generation managing the 
family firm.  We attribute this effect to Sharma and Salvato’s (2011) findings that 
dynastic family firms have found a seamless balance between the controlling 
family and nonfamily professionals.  In this setting, radical innovations developed 
through an exploration of resources are the family’s responsibility whereas 
nonfamily professional managers concentrate on operational matters exploiting 
existing resources.  When the level of exploration is at its lowest during the third 
family generation managing the firm, the family is still in a strong transition process 
trying to find a balance between maintaining control of the business whilst also 
managing it.  Those family firms that succeed this transition process experience 
higher levels of exploration and thus long-term growth through the creation of 
Schumpeterian rents.  
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Furthermore, our empirical results confirm an inverted U-shape relationship 
between generational involvement in a family firm’s management and the level of 
exploitation.  The highest level of exploitation is attained when the second family 
generation manages the family firm.  At this stage family firms often deal with 
challenges arising from the foundations of the family firm laid by the founder.  Over 
time, family firm founders tend to be come afraid of losing their wealth reflected in 
a higher risk-aversion and an emphasis on exploitation rather than exploration of 
resources (Casillas et al., 2010; Eddleston et al., 2013).  The second-generation 
managing the firm tends to adopt the strategic initiatives and goals laid by the 
founder thus continuing to focus on the exploitation of resources.  Moreover, 
second generation family firms tend to suffer from conflicts among siblings taking 
over the management of the firm struggling to find a common strategy and balance 
between continuing the path set by the founder and exploring new opportunities 
(Lubatkin et al., 2005).  
 
Nevertheless, since our findings confirm an inverted U-shape relationship the level 
of exploitation decreases when the management of the family business is 
transitioned from the second to the third-and-beyond-generation.  At this stage the 
generation managing the family firm seems to have found a solution for their initial 
conflicts in the form of introducing external, professional managers that take over 
the operational management of the family business whilst family members active 
in the management focus on explorative activities (Eddleston et al., 2013).  The 
Overall level of exploitation should thus decrease as the family place an increased 
emphasis on explorative initiatives creating long-term growth through 
Schumpeterian rents.  
 
Finally, our results offer interesting insights why a mere ten percent of first 
generation family businesses successfully transition to the third generation:  While 
the level of exploration and thus the creation of long-term growth through 
Schumpeterian rents is at its lowest in the third generation managing the family 
business, the level of exploitation and thus the creation of short-term profits 
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through Ricardian rents is at its peak in the second generation managing the 
family business.  The crucial transition process in a family firm’s management thus 
seems to occur during the second and third generation, at least in terms of the 
family firms’ focus on exploration and exploitation.  Yet, as exploration and 
exploitation are seen as an important driver of differences in family firm 
performance (Sharma & Salvato, 2011) our results suggest that in imbalance 
between both occurs between the second and third family generation managing 
the family firm, which might explain why so few family firms succeed in the 
transition process.  
 
6.1. Implications for theory and practice 
Three important contributions emerge from our paper.  First our research extends 
the ongoing debate regarding family firm heterogeneity by including generational 
involvement in a family firm’s management as a variable explaining observed 
difference in family firm behavior.  In doing so we answer Sharma and Salvato’s 
(2011) to further refine and test how family firms exploit and explore new 
opportunities over different life cycle stages.  We show how generational 
involvement in family firms influences a family firms’ focus on either exploration or 
exploitation over time suggesting that during different life cycle stages both 
orientations receive a varying degree of attention.  Moreover, existing research 
assumes that those family firms continuously combining exploration with 
exploitation will perform better than other ones (e.g. Patel & Fiet, 2011).  Our 
findings suggest that a simultaneous combination of both is difficult to achieve for 
family firms over life-cycle stages as generations place a different importance on 
either exploration or exploitation.  However, those family firms succeeding in 
achieving both simultaneously are expected to achieve superior performance 
results over the long term (Stubner et al., 2012; Webb et al., 2010). 
 
Second, we add some knowledge to the RBV literature by proposing a non-linear 
relationship between Schumpeterian rent creation through exploration and 
Ricardian rent creation through exploitation.  Previous findings suggest that while 
most firms use a combination of both exploration and exploitation as rent creation 
The Impact of Succesor Generation Discount in Family Firms: Examining Nonlinear Effects on 
Exploration and Exploitation  
176 
mechanisms (Makadok, 2001), one or the other dominates in certain context (Lim 
et al., 2013).  While previous research has mostly focused on environmental or 
industry differences to describe these differences, we add a life-cycle stage 
perspective to the debate by introducing generational involvement in family firms 
as an explanatory variable explaining observed differences in rent creation 
mechanisms through exploration and exploitation.  Our findings thus confirm that 
both rent creation mechanisms occur cyclically in a family firm context depending 
on the generation managing the firm.  
 
Third our work offers insights to family firm managers that both rent creation 
mechanisms are important during different generational stages of the family firm’s 
development.  Both extremes require a careful balance depending on which 
generation currently manages the family firm to be successful in the long run.  
 
6.2. Study limitations and future research 
 
As with any paper there are limitations to the presented research offering several 
routes for future investigations.  First, we take a family firm’s life cycle as a static 
contingent on a specific family generation managing the family firm.  However, 
different life cycle stages of a family firm can occur within a single family 
generation managing the family business.  Future studies should therefore 
account for more fine-grained life-cycle stages of a family firm in a multi-level 
research design.  Second, we do not account for a family firm founder’s influence 
on a firm’s strategy and goals often having a wide reaching impact on the future 
development of the firm well into the second or third-and-beyond-generation 
managing the firm.  A family firm founder’s preference for either Schumpeterian 
rent creation through exploration or Ricardian rent creation through exploitation 
can have a significant impact on the emphasis placed on either mechanism by 
future generations managing the firm.  Future research should thus incorporate the 
initial strategic direction set for the business by the founder.  Third, our paper is 
based on cross-sectional data with answers provided by one key informant per 
company.  Although we found no indication of common method or respondent bias 
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(Phillips, 1981; Podsakoff et al., 2003), future studies should aim to include 
multiple key informants and a longitudinal research design.  Fourth our data were 
collected amongst German family firms only.  Given the cultural differences 
occurring both in terms of generational involvement in family firms and different 
rent creation mechanisms across different cultures (Chrisman et al., 2011; 
Tushman & O'Reilly III, 1996), our results may not be generalizable to family firms 
outside Germany.  A multi-country study examining the effects of cultural 
influences on both exploration and exploitation as well as generational 
involvement in family firms is thus desirable.  Finally, including third-and-beyond 
generation firms in our paper can be seen as the outcome of a selection bias since 
their survival indicates a successful balance between exploration and exploitation 
creating superior long-term performance returns.  This limitation requires a more 
detailed analysis at what stage in their development family firms achieve a strong 
balance between both extremes and whether this balance actually produces 
superior return compared to a strategy focused on either exploitation or 
exploration.  
 
6.3. Conclusion 
  
The current paper examined the nonlinear effects of generational involvement in 
family firm management and its impact on the level of exploration and exploitation 
in privately held family firms.  The unique insight of the research is that 
generational involvement in family firm management leads to a U-shape 
relationship in explorative activities reaching its lowest point during the third 
generation and an inverse U-shape relationship in exploitative activities reaching 
its peak in the second generation managing the family firm.  As such generational 
involvement in family firm management uniquely affects the level of exploration 
and exploitation in family firms.  Our paper offers distinct insights for researchers 
suggesting that family firms apply different rent creation mechanisms during 
different generational management stages hinting towards the difficulty of 
simultaneously pursuing an exploration for new opportunities and exploitation of 
existing resources in family firms.   
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Appendix 1: Exploration and Exploitation Questionnaire Items 
 
(Source: Lubatkin, Simsek, Ling, & Veiga, 2006) 
  
10.
       
...sucht nach neuartigen Ideen, indem es "über den Tellerrand" hinausschaut.     
...sichert den Erfolg durch die Fähigkeit, neue Technologien zu entdecken.     
...entwickelt innovative Produkte oder Dienstleistungen.     
...sucht kreative Wege, um Kundenbedürfnisse zu befriedigen.     
...tritt regelmäßig entschlossen in neue Marktsegmente ein.     
...versucht aktiv neue Kundengruppen anzusprechen.     
...ist auf Qualitätsverbesserungen und Kostensenkungen ausgerichtet.     
...verbessert kontinuierlich die Zuverlässigkeit bestehender Produkte.     
...steigert ständig den Automatisierungsgrad der Prozesse.     
…prüft regelmäßig die Zufriedenheit bestehender Kunden.     
...optimiert bestehende Angebote, um aktuelle Kunden zufrieden zu stellen.     
...versucht die bestehende Kundenbasis weiter auszuschöpfen.     
Trifft über‐
haupt 
nicht zu
Trifft voll 
und ganz 
zu
Wie stark treffen folgende Eigenschaften auf Ihr Unternehmen zu?
Bitte beurteilen Sie, inwiefern die Aussagen auf Ihr Unternehmen vor der Krise zugetroffen haben und 
ob sie sich in der Krise verstärkt (+) oder abgeschwächt (‐) haben.
Unser Unternehmen... 
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Appendix 2: F-PEC Scale Questionnaire Items 
 
24. Ja  Nein 
Unabhängig davon, wie viele Gesellschafter im Unternehmen aktiv sind: Sehen Sie sich als ein klassisches Familienunternehmen?
Falls ja: Was charakterisiert Sie als Familienunternehmen?
25.
Ihr Unternehmen gehört:   • Eignerfamilie(n) 
• Familienfremden (z.B. Management, Investoren)
26. Wie stark sind Mitglieder der Eignerfamilie(n) in der Führung des Unternehmens aktiv?
Aus wie vielen Mitgliedern besteht Ihre Geschäftsführung insgesamt?
Wie Familienmitglieder sind in der Geschäftsführung Ihres Unternehmens?
Ja Nein
Verfügt Ihr Unternehmen über ein Aufsichts‐ oder Beiratsgremium o.ä.?  
Falls ja: Wie viele Mitglieder gehören diesem insgesamt an?
Wie viele davon sind Mitglieder der Eignerfamilie(n)?
Wie viele der Nicht‐Familienmitglieder des Gremiums wurden von Familienmitgliedern 
benannt?
                      
                      
Wie viele der Nicht‐Familienmitglieder in der Geschäftsführung wurden von Familienmitgliedern ausgesucht?
Vor der Krise
Würden Sie Ihr Unternehmen als "Familienunternehmen" bezeichnen?
                      
Wie hoch ist der Anteil am Unternehmen, der von Familienmitgliedern gehalten wird? 
Bitte geben Sie an, wie viel Prozent des Eigenkapitals durch die Eignerfamilie(n) gehalten werden. Bitte geben Sie auch an, ob sich 
dieser Anteil durch die Krise erhöht (+) oder verringert (‐) hat.
                      
Bitte geben Sie jeweils an, wie viele Familienmitglieder in den Gremien aktiv sind. Bitte geben Sie auch an, ob sich die Anzah in der 
Krise erhöht (+) oder verringert (‐) hat.
Vor der Krise
                      %
                      %
                      
                      
Vor der Krise
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27.
Die wievielte Familiengeneration ist Eigentümer des Unternehmens?
Welche Generation führt das Unternehmen? 
Welche Generation ist aktiv im Aufsichts‐ oder Beirat?
Wie viele Familienmitglieder arbeiten im Unternehmen (in leitender oder nicht leitender Funktion)? 
Wie viele Familienmitglieder sind zwar nicht aktiv, aber am Unternehmen interessiert?
Wie viele Familienmitglieder haben kein Interesse am Unternehmen gezeigt?
28.
Die Familie hat sehr großen Einfluss auf das Unternehmen.     
Die Familienmitglieder haben vergleichbare Wertvorstellungen.     
Eignerfamilie und Unternehmen haben die gleichen Wertvorstellungen.     
    
    
… fühlt sich loyal gegenüber dem Unternehmen.      
… ist einig mit den Zielen, Werten und Strategien des Unternehmens.     
… ist wirklich interessiert an der Entwicklung des Unternehmens.     
… profitiert langfristig sehr stark durch das Engagement im Unternehmen.     
… glaubt, dass die Familien‐ und Unternehmenswerte übereinstimmen.     
Trifft voll 
und ganz 
zu
Wie aktiv ist die Eignerfamilie im Unternehmen engagiert?
Bitte geben Sie jeweils die höchste Generationenzahl bzw. die Anzahl an Familienmitgliedern an. 
Geben Sie bitte auch jeweils an, inwieweit sich diese Anzahl in der Krise erhöht (+) oder verringert (‐) hat.
                      
Bitte beurteilen Sie folgende Aussagen für Ihr Unternehmen. Geben Sie bitte auch an, ob 
sich die Haltung in der Krise verstärkt (+) oder verringert (‐) hat.
Wie bewerten Sie die folgenden Aussagen in Bezug auf Ihr Unternehmen?
Trifft über‐
haupt 
nicht zu
                      
Die Familie …
… erzählt stolz, dass sie Teil des Unternehmens ist.
… steht in Diskussionen mit Freunden, Angestellten und anderen 
   Familienmitgliedern voll hinter dem Unternehmen.  
… engagiert sich überdurchschnittlich für den Erfolg des Unternehmens.
Trifft voll 
und ganz 
zu
Trifft über‐
haupt 
nicht zu
  
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(Source: Astrachan, Klein, & Smyrnios, 2002; Klein, Astrachan, & Smyrnios, 2005) 
  
Falls Sie selbst Mitglied der Eignerfamilie sind: Ich (als Familienmitglied) …


… verstehe und unterstütze die Entscheidung meiner Familie für 
   die Zukunft des Familienunternehmens.  
 ... erfahre durch mein Engagement im Familienunternehmen einen 
   positiven Einfluss auf mein Leben.
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Appendix 3: Performance Items 
 
 
(Source. Geringer & Herbert, 1991; Slater & Narver, 1993) 
 
19. Wie hat sich Ihr Unternehmen in den letzten Jahren entwickelt? 
Bitte geben Sie die Werte für jedes Jahr an. Geben sie bitte auch eine Schätzung für 2009 ab.
Umsatz (in Mio. EUR)
Ergebnis der gewöhnlichen Geschäftstätigkeit (EBIT; in Mio. EUR)
Eigenkapital (in Mio. EUR)
Eigenkapitalquote (in %)
Bilanzsumme (in Mio. EUR)
20072006 2008
21. Wie beurteilen Sie das Ergebnis Ihres Unternehmens insgesamt?
Ergebnis relativ zu Ihren größten Wettbewerbern?     
Ergebnis relativ zu Ihrer Branche?     
Ergebnis relativ zu Ihren Planzielen?     
Bitte geben Sie an, wie Sie die Entwicklung Ihres Unternehmens beurteilen. 
Bitte kreuzen Sie jeweils eine Antwort an. 
Deutlich 
schlechter
Deutlich 
besser
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